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Going Rogue: Stop the Beach Renourishment as
an Object of Morbid Fascination
Mary Doyle* and Stephen J. Schnably**
Scholarly response to the Supreme Court’s decision in Stop the Beach Renourishment,
Inc. v. Florida Department of Environmental Protection has focused on the plurality’s
strong advocacy of a judicial takings doctrine. We take a different tack. While the concept
of judicial takings is worthy of serious attention, it is wrong to treat the plurality opinion
as an ordinary object of analysis. It is, instead, the emanation of a Court going rogue.
Three basic symptoms of the pathology stand out. First, sleight of hand: The plurality
opinion purports to be about an institutional issue—can a state court commit a taking?—
while slipping in a major rewrite of takings law that would undermine the Court’s recent,
unanimous effort to clarify it. Second, feigned obliviousness: The plurality opinion
conveniently overlooks the Court’s federalism jurisprudence even as it would expand the
federal courts’ power over state law. Third, knowing artlessness: Despite being written as
a virtuoso performance—identifying a case the Florida Supreme Court “overlooked”—
the plurality’s treatment of state law betrays surprising naïveté as to how state law is made,
though, as it turns out, this seeming naïveté serves the purpose of shifting power within
states from legislatures to courts.
While the history and tone of Justice Scalia’s close attention to beach access issues makes
pique a surprisingly strong candidate for why the plurality went rogue, the more worrying
explanation is the willingness of the Court’s more conservative members to expand their
own power into new areas of state law without the slightest sign of support from the
political branches. There is a danger that conservative attacks on courts over decisions on
controversial social issues will distract from a more basic problem: If the Court’s
enforcement of federalism rests on what Justice O’Connor called Congress’s
“underdeveloped capacity for self-restraint,” we suggest that commentary should focus on
the Court’s own similarly underdeveloped capacity.

* Professor of Law, University of Miami.
** Professor of Law, University of Miami. We are grateful for comments we received from John
Leshy, James Brudney, and Louis Mandarini, and for comments on an earlier version from David
Abraham, Barbara Brandon, Sergio Campos, Charlton Copeland, Michael Froomkin, Stephen
Halpert, Lili Levi, Kunal Parker, and other members of the Miami Legal Theory Workshop. We
would like to thank Arthur J.R. Baker, Simeon Genadiev, and Lauren Spahn for excellent research
assistance.
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Introduction: Rogue Rage
Is it possible for a state court to commit a taking when it decides the
content of property rights under state law? The Supreme Court seemed
poised to adopt a “judicial takings” doctrine when it agreed to hear Stop
the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida Department of Environmental
1
Protection. Its failure to produce a majority opinion, however, left the
2
matter open.

1. 130 S. Ct. 2592 (2010). For a typical prediction by one takings scholar, see Ben Barros, What’s at
Stake in Stop the Beach Renourishment, PropertyProf Blog (July 1, 2009), http://lawprofessors.
typepad.com/property/2009/07/whats-at-stake-in-stop-the-beach-renourishment.html (“I would guess that
Justice Scalia was instrumental in obtaining the cert grant. I predict that the Supreme Court will find a
taking in Stop the Beach and that Justice Scalia will write the opinion of the Court.”); see also Gary K.
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Scholarly response to Beach Renourishment has largely focused on
3
the plurality’s strong advocacy of a judicial takings doctrine. We take a
different tack. The concept of judicial takings is worthy of the serious
4
(and often insightful) attention it has received. But it is wrong to treat

Odehoff, Florida’s Beach Restoration Program Weathers a Storm in the Courts: Stop the Beach
Renourishment v. Florida Department of Environmental Protection, 84 Fla. B.J. 10, 19 (2010).
2. Justice Scalia’s plurality opinion, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas and
Alito, accepted the concept of judicial takings. Beach Renourishment, 130 S. Ct. at 2601–02. Justice
Kennedy, joined by Justice Sotomayor, concluded that a state court might violate substantive due
process rights in defining property. Id. at 2614–15 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment). Justice Breyer, joined by Justice Ginsburg, argued that since no member of the Court
believed the Florida Supreme Court had committed a taking on the facts of the case, there was no
need to reach any conclusions about the applicability of the Takings Clause to state courts. Id. at 2618–
19 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). Justice Stevens took no part in the
decision. Id. at 2597 (syllabus).
3. Among the more useful in understanding the background of the case are Sidney F. Ansbacher
et al., Stop the Beach Renourishment Stops Private Beachowners’ Right to Exclude the Public, 12 Vt.
J. Envtl. L. 43 (2010); Craig Anthony Arnold, Legal Castles in the Sand: The Evolution of Property
Law, Culture, and Ecology in Coastal Lands, 61 Syracuse L. Rev. 213 (2011); Michael C. Blumm &
Elizabeth B. Dawson, The Florida Beach Case and the Road to Judicial Takings, 35 Wm. & Mary
Envtl. L. & Pol’y Rev. 713 (2011). The Vermont Law Review published a useful set of articles by
lawyers for the amici in the case; for an introduction, see L. Kinvin Wroth, Hold Back the Sea: The
Common Law and the Constitution, 35 Vt. L. Rev. 413 (2010); see also Scott D. Makar, Reflections on
Stop the Beach Renourishment v. Florida Department of Environmental Protection, 61 Syracuse L.
Rev. 281 (2011) (views of Florida Solicitor General). For an extensive analysis of the Florida Supreme
Court’s opinion, see Sidney F. Ansbacher, Stop the Beach Renourishment: A Case of MacGuffins and
Legal Fictions, 35 Nova L. Rev. 587 (2011); see also Donna R. Christie, Of Beaches, Boundaries and
SOBs, 25 J. Land Use & Envtl. L. 19 (2009).
Much of the reaction to Beach Renourishment has been critical. See, e.g., J. Peter Byrne, Stop
the Stop the Beach Plurality!, 38 Ecology L.Q. 619 (2011); John D. Echeverria, Stop the Beach
Renourishment: Why the Judiciary Is Different, 35 Vt. L. Rev. 475 (2010); Timothy M. Mulvaney, The
New Judicial Takings Construct, 120 Yale L.J. 247 (2011); Daniel L. Siegel, Why We Will Probably
Never See a Judicial Takings Doctrine, 35 Vt. L. Rev. 459 (2010); The Supreme Court, 2009 Term—
Leading Cases, 124 Harv. L. Rev. 154, 299 (2010); Ian Fein, Note, Why Judicial Takings Are Unripe,
38 Ecology L.Q. 749 (2011). For more supportive views, see Ilya Somin, Stop the Beach
Renourishment and the Problem of Judicial Takings, 6 Duke J. Const. L. & Pub. Pol’y 91 (2011);
Robert H. Thomas et al., Of Woodchucks and Prune Yards: A View of Judicial Takings from the
Trenches, 35 Vt. L. Rev. 437 (2010).
Articles that usefully address the procedural questions in bringing a judicial takings claim
(and come to different conclusions) include Fein, supra, and Josh Patashnik, Note, Bringing a Judicial
Takings Claim, 64 Stan. L. Rev. 255 (2012).
4. The notion of judicial takings has a long history. Some late nineteenth and early twentieth
century Supreme Court cases suggested that state courts might violate the Contracts Clause or Takings
Clause (or both) in determining state law, but these suggestions seemed abandoned by the 1930s. See
Benjamin Fletcher Wright, Jr., The Contract Clause of the Constitution 239–40 (1938); Paul B.
Stephan, Redistributive Litigation—Judicial Innovation, Private Expectations, and the Shadow of
International Law, 88 Va. L. Rev. 789, 823–30 (2002); Barton H. Thompson, Jr., The History of the
Judicial Impairment “Doctrine” and Its Lessons for the Contract Clause, 44 Stan. L. Rev. 1373, 1433,
1463–66 (1992). More recently the doctrine rested on three pillars. One was Hughes v. Washington,
389 U.S. 290, 296 (1967) (Stewart, J., concurring) (arguing that if a state court makes “a sudden change
in state law, unpredictable in terms of the relevant precedents,” it may violate the Takings Clause).
The second was Barton Thompson’s classic article on the idea of a judicial taking, which thoughtfully
explored its history and the arguments for and against it and concluded that it had some merit. Barton
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the plurality opinion as an ordinary object of analysis. It is, instead, the
emanation of a Court going rogue. To fail to recognize this is to lose
one’s way at the outset.
Of course, to call a court a “rogue” is to enter territory largely
staked out by conservative pundits and politicians. George Will famously
5
deemed the Florida Supreme Court a rogue in 2000. Rick Santorum
proclaimed the Ninth Circuit a “rogue” and a “pox” for its liberal
6
decisions. Newt Gingrich’s resort to attacks on judicial arrogance and his
promise, if elected president, to flout the Supreme Court’s Guantánamo
decisions drew mainstream disapproval—but they reflected a major
national politician’s judgment that attacks on the judiciary appeal to
7
many voters.

H. Thompson, Jr., Judicial Takings, 76 Va. L. Rev. 1449 (1990) [hereinafter Thompson, Judicial
Takings]. The third was Justice Scalia’s dissent from the denial of certiorari in Stevens v. City of
Cannon Beach; the standard he proposed there turned on whether the state court had relied on a
“pretextural” property rule. 510 U.S. 1207, 1214 (1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
Eduardo M. Peñalver & Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Judicial Takings or Due Process?,
97 Cornell L. Rev. 305 (2012) (examining judicial takings doctrine as a form of judicial insurance with
certain moral hazards), is one of the more interesting scholarly treatments since Thompson’s. For
other analyses of judicial takings, see D. Benjamin Barros, Defining “Property” in the Just
Compensation Clause, 63 Fordham L. Rev. 1853 (1995); W. David Sarratt, Judicial Takings and the
Course Pursued, 90 Va. L. Rev. 1487 (2004); Roderick E. Walston, The Constitution and Property: Due
Process, Regulatory Takings, and Judicial Takings, 2001 Utah L. Rev. 379; J. Nicholas Bunch, Note,
Takings, Judicial Takings, and Patent Law, 83 Tex. L. Rev. 1747 (2005).
One can also find intimations of something similar to judicial takings in analyses of areas of
law undergoing significant judicial revision. See John Martinez, Taking Time Seriously: The Federal
Constitutional Right to Be Free from “Startling” State Court Overrulings, 11 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y
297, 341–46 (1988) (arguing for a constitutional “startlement” claim arising from a Hawaii Supreme
Court ruling on water rights of land owners adjacent to streams); Geoffrey R. Scott, The Expanding
Public Trust Doctrine: A Warning to Environmentalists and Policy Makers, 10 Fordham Envtl. L.J. 1,
69 (1998) (suggesting that judicial decisions on public trust that come as “a legitimate shock to
landowners” should occasion a call on “the public fisc” to support the burden of the change).
5. George Will, Florida’s Rogue Court, Wash. Post, Nov. 28, 2000, at A27 (“The U.S. Supreme
Court will consider whether Florida’s Supreme Court rewrote [state] election law when it moved the
reporting deadline to facilitate selective recounts under shifting standards in Democratic
strongholds.”).
6. GOP Candidates Would Cut Federal Judges’ Power, Wash. Post, Oct. 23, 2011,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/gop-candidates-would-cut-federal-judges-power/2011/10/23/
gIQA5u4Z9L_story.html. The Ninth Circuit has long been a target of conservative politicians. See
John Schwartz, “Liberal” Reputation Precedes Ninth Circuit Court, N.Y. Times, Apr. 24, 2010, at
A33A.
7. For Gingrich’s position, see Bringing the Courts Back Under the Constitution: NEWT 2012
Position Paper Supporting Item No. 9 of the 21st Century Contract with America (Oct. 7, 2011)
[hereinafter NEWT]. The attacks evoked widespread criticism, both conservative, see, e.g., Michael
Gerson, Newt Gingrich, The Man Who Knows Too Much, Wash. Post, Jan. 23, 2012,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/newt-gingrichs-troublesome-lack-of-prudence/2012/01/23/
gIQAslX6LQ_story.html (“This is a presidential candidate promising a constitutional crisis, then
arrogantly dismissing the criticism of his recklessness.”), and liberal, see, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, OpEd., GOP Candidates: Bashing Judges, Threatening Democracy, L.A. Times, Dec. 20, 2011,
http://articles.latimes.com/2011/dec/20/opinion/la-oe-chemerinsky-fedjudges-20111220 (“[T]his year’s
political rhetoric about the courts . . . is . . . mean-spirited and it shows a stunning ignorance of the
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The charge that the Court is a rogue has not featured prominently in
8
conservative scholarly criticism. Still, the idea of judicial takings, long
championed by commentators advocating stronger protection of
property rights, has deep resonance with the charge. Allegations of
roguish behavior seem to go hand in hand with judicial takings. One of
the Florida Supreme Court justices issued a blistering dissent from the
opinion under review in Beach Renourishment, asserting that the
majority had “‘butchered’ Florida law” with its “manipulation” of the
legal issues, and “simply erased well-established Florida law without
9
proper analysis.” For many years the most common articulation of a
judicial takings standard was Justice Stewart’s 1967 concurrence in
Hughes v. Washington, in which he proposed that if a state court changed
property law in a “sudden” and “unpredictable” way—hardly the
attributes we associate with a properly functioning judiciary—that act
10
could constitute a taking. Calling for a judicial takings doctrine in 1994,
Justice Scalia raised the prospect that a major Oregon Supreme Court
11
holding had invoked “nonexistent rules of state substantive law” to
effectuate a “landgrab” running “the entire length of the Oregon
12
coast.”
The conservative focus on rogue courts is puzzling, to say the least.
In recent years the Court, after all, has continued dismantling campaign
13
14
finance regulation, read new life into the Second Amendment, eroded
15
the right to abortion, raised doubts about the status of independent
16
federal agencies, and fashioned limits on the Commerce Clause and
constraints on the spending power to pose major questions about federal
Constitution and American history.”); see also Adam Liptak & Michael D. Shear, Among Legal
Ranks, Shrugs for Gingrich’s Tough Talk, N.Y. Times, Dec. 20, 2011, at A24 (“Reactions vary from
amusement to alarm. What is hard to find is approval.”); Adam Liptak & Michael D. Shear,
Republicans Turn Judicial Power into a Campaign Issue, N.Y. Times, Oct. 23, 2011, http://
www.nytimes.com/2011/10/24/us/politics/republicans-turn-judicial-power-into-a-campaign-issue.html.
8. For an exception, see Steven W. Fitschen, Impeaching Federal Judges: A Covenantal and
Constitutional Response to Judicial Tyranny, 10 Regent U. L. Rev. 111, 118 (1998) (“[A]lthough no
federal judge has ever been impeached for rendering unconstitutional opinions, it is historically and
constitutionally defensible to begin to do so.”).
9. Walton Cnty. v. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc., 998 So. 2d 1102, 1121 (Fla. 2008)
(Lewis, J., dissenting). He was joined by one other Justice on the seven-member court, Justice Wells.
10. See Hughes v. Washington, 389 U.S. 290, 296 (1967) (Stewart, J., concurring); see also supra
note 4.
11. Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach, 510 U.S. 1207, 1211 (1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting from denial
of certiorari).
12. Id. at 1212. As we show below, moreover, one consistent theme underlying support for a
judicial takings doctrine has been the specter of state court “collaboration” with the legislature to
undermine property rights on the cheap—without compensation. See infra Part III.B.
13. E.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010); Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724 (2008).
14. E.g., District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008); McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S.
Ct. 3020, 3044 (2010).
15. E.g., Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007).
16. E.g., Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138 (2010).
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17

programs and regulation for years to come. In the area of takings law,
moreover, the concern is equally puzzling. What could possibly account
for a fear that rogue state courts need to be reined in before they destroy
property rights? The ideology of property rights protection is strongly
entrenched in popular opinion and legal culture, and judges are not alien
to it. And even if state courts were to disrespect property rights, those
rights are highly popular in state legislatures—which can choose to
18
overrule certain common law decisions.
Conventional legal analysis is not going to explain this puzzle. We
might drop legal analysis entirely and turn to the Freudian idea of
projection to explain conservative attacks on courts as rogues even as the
Supreme Court has moved steadily to the right over the last few
19
decades.
We propose, instead, to employ a new approach to scholarly
commentary on the Court’s opinions, one that refuses to leave the claim
that the Court is going seriously amiss entirely to conservative critics.
Reflecting the prominence of the theme among conservatives, we take
our inspiration from Sarah Palin’s campaign memoir of the same title.
We do not refer, however, to her proud adoption of “Going Rogue” as a
badge of honor, the mark of a down-to-earth politician who refused to
stay on message (to the distress of the McCain campaign) and always
20
strained instead to speak common sense to the people. Nor do we refer

17. E.g., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012). Of course, in the view of
four of the conservative Justices, this record is not enough. It was, we are told, the failure to invalidate
the Affordable Care Act in its entirety—wiping out the chief domestic legacy of a President—that
mired the Court in “a vast judicial overreaching.” Id. at 2676 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, Alito, JJ.,
dissenting).
18. A state legislature might run into a takings problem if it overruled a state court decision
expanding the definition of property rights, since its action could be said to restrict property rights. But
it would likely encounter no such problem overruling a state court decision that had limited property
rights; legislative expansions of property rights have not been the prime concern of the Takings
Clause. See Lynn E. Blais, Takings, Statutes, and the Common Law: Considering Inherent Limitations
on Title, 70 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1, 24 (1996) (“The Takings Clause . . . act[s] as a shield between private
property owners and attempts by the majority to impose the burdens of public benefits on a few
individuals.”).
19. See Chemerinsky, supra note 7 (“It is ironic that conservatives continue with such attacks
even as there is a conservative majority on the Supreme Court and its rulings overall are far more to
the liking of conservatives than liberals.”). For a similar (and prescient) point in the context of
environmental and property law, see Richard J. Lazarus, Changing Conceptions of Property and
Sovereignty in Natural Resources: Questioning the Public Trust Doctrine, 71 Iowa L. Rev. 631, 712
(1986) (arguing that, despite conservative critics’ attacks on alleged judicial activism in public trust
doctrine, courts are for the most part unlikely to favor environmental interests over property rights).
20. Sarah Palin, Going Rogue: An American Life 298–99 (2009); see also id. at 209–339. For
another account, see John Heilemann & Mark Halperin, Game Change: Obama and the Clintons,
McCain and Palin, and the Race of a Lifetime 353–427 (2010).
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21

to Joe McGinniss’ portrayal of her as both carnival sideshow and rogue
22
elephant.
23
Rather, drawing on the more playful connotations of the term, we
pay our respects to The Onion Magazine’s report in January 2011 that
“morbid curiosity” about what would happen if Palin were elected
24
president was leading many voters to support her. The plurality opinion
in Beach Renourishment, we submit, reflects some dangerous tendencies
in the Court today. Giving in to a morbid fascination with its
breathtaking disregard for basic norms of judicial opinion writing and
indulging morbid curiosity about the future direction of a Court in which
the plurality opinion could attract five votes turn out to be surprisingly
good ways to canvass those dangers.
What does this morbid fascination uncover? As we will show, three
basic characteristics stand out. First, the plurality opinion purports to be
about an institutional issue—are state courts capable of committing a
taking?—while slipping in a major rewrite of takings law. Sleight of hand
25
26
is not commonly thought a virtue in legislation or in opinion-writing.
Second, the plurality opinion treats the resolution of the
institutional issues as reflecting a deep respect for state autonomy—

21. Joe McGinniss, The Rogue: Searching for the Real Sarah Palin 268–69, 318 (2011).
22. See id. flyleaf (defining “rogue” as: “[a]n elephant that has separated from a herd and roams
about alone, in which state it is very savage” (quoting Webster’s Revised Unabridged Dictionary)).
For another use of the term—not one we adopt—see Jamal Greene, The Anticanon, 125 Harv. L. Rev.
379, 463 (2011) (“[R]ogue judges [are] incompetent, drunk, or on the make.”); Hank Grezlak & Zack
Needles, A Court Gone Rogue, Am. Lawyer, Feb. 2012, at 62 (kickback scandal in Pennsylvania
juvenile court). In his interesting account, Greene focuses on what he calls “anticanonical” holdings,
widely cited as examples of fundamental error on the Supreme Court’s part. These opinions, he
argues, share several characteristics. They are “protean,” generating multiple, competing explanations
for their error; their force as examples to avoid often resides at least in part in the skill of their
reasoning; and at least in their time they had some claim to reflect prevailing ethical views (even if we
conclude that such views were immoral). Greene, supra, at 460–66. As we shall see, anti-canonical
status would be a step up for the Beach Renourishment plurality.
23. The Oxford English Dictionary gives one definition of rogue as a “mischievous person, esp. a
child; a person whose behaviour one disapproves of but who is nonetheless likeable or attractive. Freq.
as a playful term of reproof or reproach or as a term of endearment.” Rogue, Oxford English
Dictionary, http://www.oed.com/viewdictionaryentry/Entry/166894 (last visited Oct. 2, 2012).
24. Onion News Network, Morbid Curiosity Leading Many Voters to Support Palin, The Onion
(Jan. 19, 2011), http://www.theonion.com/section/sarah-palin.
25. Cf. BP Am. Prod. Co. v. Burton, 549 U.S. 84, 99 (2006) (“It is entirely unrealistic to suggest
that Congress would proceed by such an oblique and cryptic route.”).
26. See, e.g., Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 546 (2007) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (accusing
the majority of sleight of hand); Florida ex rel. Att’y Gen. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs.,
648 F.3d 1235, 1297 (11th Cir. 2011) (“[T]he government’s uniqueness argument relies upon a
convenient sleight of hand to deflect attention from the central issue in the case . . . .”). Cf. Rasul v.
Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 493–94 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority for taking the
“oblique course” of pretending not to overrule an earlier case while holding inconsistently with it);
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 59 (2004) (Scalia, J.) (“If [the Court] had meant authoritatively
to announce an exception—previously unknown to this Court’s jurisprudence— . . . it would not have
done so in such an oblique manner.”).
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refusing to privilege courts over legislatures—while entirely ignoring the
Court’s federalism jurisprudence as it expands its own power over state
property law. Whether reflecting blissful ignorance or feigned
obliviousness (we think the latter more likely), the opinion’s disregard
for a whole line of important cases is quite the spectacle.
Third, the ensuing analysis of state property law that the plurality’s
test requires it to undertake is written as a virtuoso performance—
identifying as the key holding a case that, weirdly (to use Justice Scalia’s
27
term), the Florida Supreme Court did not even cite. Yet the plurality’s
treatment of state law is artless, to say the least—but as we shall
demonstrate, almost knowingly so.
What accounts for such a memorable performance? Why did the
Court “go rogue”? A little morbid curiosity about the mind of the
opinion’s author suggests one possibility: pique. As we will discuss,
Justice Scalia has strong views about how public access to beaches should
be determined. Beach Renourishment reminds us that lengthy tenure can
breed arrogance alongside the wisdom of experience.
Still, pique hardly explains how the opinion gained four votes and
occasioned an elaborate statement by two other Justices in favor of new
constitutional supervision of state courts’ property determinations. Here
is where morbid fascination gives us a glimpse of what the future holds if
the plurality’s approach to constitutional law becomes predominant.
Coming within one vote of a major conservative ruling on new property
rights protections, the Beach Renourishment plurality represents a vision
of judicial power that legitimizes its use to promote new federal (judicial)
intervention into matters previously left largely to the states, without any
sign of support from the political branches for doing so.
It should be no surprise that such a vision would be pursued in an
opinion marked by sleight of hand, feigned obliviousness, and knowing
artlessness. Strengthening the protection of property rights is a goal that
no doubt finds real support from many citizens, but it is a goal that
competes with other values held by many as well, including the
28
protection and enjoyment of the environment. For Justices seeking to
make a controversial move, stealth must be tempting.
In the past when it stepped out of bounds—when, in Justice Scalia’s
trenchant formulation, it “was considered by many . . . an activist, antiNew Deal Court bent on reducing the power of President Franklin
29
Roosevelt” —the Court resorted to misleading accounts of its work.

27. Transcript of Oral Argument at 27, 28, Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of
Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592 (2010) (No. 08-1151) (remark by Justice Scalia) (finding the Florida
Supreme Court’s failure to cite a case on point “weird”).
28. See, e.g., Amy H. Moorman, Let’s Roll: Applying Land-Based Notions of Property to the
Migrating Barrier Islands, 31 Wm. & Mary Envtl. L. & Pol’y Rev. 459, 491–92 (2007).
29. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 724 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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United States v. Butler, in which the Court invalidated yet another of
Congress’s efforts to deal with the Depression, comes to mind: All we do
when passing on legislation, the Court said, is “lay the article of the
Constitution which is invoked beside the statute which is challenged
30
and . . . decide whether the latter squares with the former.” Chief
Justice Roberts’ observation at his confirmation hearing that “[j]udges
31
are like umpires” who apply the rules rather than make them is more
than a little reminiscent of this approach. Like Chief Justice Roberts’
32
assault on the Commerce Clause in the health care case, the plurality’s
determination to reach the judicial takings question, rather than leave it
for another case in which perhaps at least one member of the Court
believed a taking to have been effected, reflects a desire to play
impresario, not umpire. When all is said and done, the line-up in the
rogues gallery is likely to include more than takings cases.

I. Three Tricks
A. Sleight of Hand
1. The Distraction
As noted, the Supreme Court’s grant of certiorari signaled a serious
possibility that it might rule that state courts—not just state agencies or
legislative bodies—could commit a taking. As it turned out, not a single
one of the Justices thought the Florida Supreme Court had committed a
taking. What divided the Justices was whether the concept of a judicial
taking should be recognized at all.
For the plurality the time was ripe to hold that a state court could
indeed commit a taking. It is not sensible, Justice Scalia argued, to
determine that there has been no constitutional violation without
33
deciding when one might occur. He concluded: “The Takings Clause
bars the State from taking private property without paying for it, no

30. 297 U.S. 1, 62 (1936).
31. Bruce Weber, Umpires v. Judges, N.Y. Times, July 12, 2009, at WK1.
32. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2584–93 (2012); see id. at 2629 n.12
(Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part) (noting
the Chief Justice’s agreement that the mandate could be supported under the taxing power); id. (“That
being so, I see no reason to undertake a Commerce Clause analysis that is not outcome
determinative.”). For a critique of the notion that the mandate is beyond Congress’s Commerce
Clause power, see Arthur J.R. Baker, Fundamental Mismatch: The Improper Integration of Individual
Liberty Rights into Commerce Clause Analysis of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 66 U.
Miami L. Rev. 259 (2011).
33. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592, 2602 (2010)
(plurality opinion); see Nat’l Aeronautics & Space Admin. v. Nelson, 131 S. Ct. 746, 767 (2011) (Scalia,
J., concurring in the judgment) (arguing against assessing whether a “hypothetical right has been
violated” without “even describing what hypothetical standard should be used”).
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matter which branch is the instrument of the taking.” In response,
Justice Kennedy argued that a judicial takings doctrine would make
sense only if state courts had the power of eminent domain, which they
do not and should not, since, unlike legislatures, they are not politically
accountable. But, he argued, unpredictable changes in the common law
35
of property might violate substantive due process. Writing separately,
Justice Breyer foresaw some potential dangers in a judicial takings
doctrine, but saw no need to reach a decision on the facts before the
36
Court.
2. The Victim: Lingle
This abstract debate over judicial takings obscured the plurality’s
sleight of hand. The plurality slipped in a proposed major change to the
substantive law of takings which had nothing to do with the ostensible
question before the Court. Equally striking, this smuggled-in change
would effectively undo a major effort by a unanimous Court to bring
clarity to takings law just a few years earlier in Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A.
37
Inc.
Lingle was an effort to rein in an amorphous body of law that posed
a real threat of judicial overreach. This threat has dogged regulatory
38
takings law since its inception in Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon. There, a
coal mining company had deeded surface rights to land on which a house
was built, reserving the right to remove all the coal under the land. Later,
the Pennsylvania legislature approved the Kohler Act, which forbade the
removal of coal if it would cause subsidence of a human habitation. The
coal company challenged the statute as a taking. The Court laid out an ad
hoc test for resolving the challenge that asked if the regulation had gone
39
“too far.” Here, it concluded, there was little if any public interest in the
34. Beach Renourishment, 130 S. Ct. at 2602. We note that the plurality’s arguments on this point
are remarkably weak. The Court has not taken the text particularly seriously in related contexts. See
infra note 91. And it does treat state courts differently from other branches of state government in
other contexts. See infra note 102. What was special about the Takings Clause the plurality simply did
not make clear.
35. Id. at 2614–15 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment). Much of Justice Scalia’s opinion was
taken up with arguing that Justice Kennedy’s substantive due process test was so manipulable as to be
meaningless. Id. at 2604–05 (Scalia, J.). He also disagreed with the other Justices that a judicial takings
doctrine would present insuperable practical difficulties or empower state courts to commit states to
spending money on takings of property. Id. at 2607.
36. Id. at 2619 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
37. 544 U.S. 528 (2005).
38. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922). Before the twentieth century, the Takings Clause
was implicated only when the government flooded or otherwise physically invaded privately owned
land or ousted its owner without paying compensation. There was no constitutional theory that the
right to compensation contained in the Takings Clause could be triggered by regulatory action. See
Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 669 (1887).
39. Pa. Coal, 260 U.S. at 413, 415 (“[T]he question depends upon the particular facts [of each
case].”).
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fate of “a single private house,” but a great adverse impact on the coal
company, which lost what was “recognized in Pennsylvania as an estate
40
in land—a very valuable estate.”
Pennsylvania Coal’s basic approach—whether the regulation went
“too far”—was not a model of clarity. In Penn Central Transportation
41
Co. v. New York City, the Court took the occasion of a challenge to
New York City’s Landmark Preservation Law to set out a few lighted
buoys on this sea of uncertainty. It highlighted several factors including
the “economic impact of the regulation on the claimant,” “the extent to
which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed
42
expectations,” and “the character of the governmental action.”
Even so, regulatory takings law admittedly remained an “essentially
43
ad hoc, factual inquir[y].” Still worse, only two years later the Court
threw another test into the mix, one that later threatened to careen out
44
of control. In Agins v. City of Tiburon, the Court seemed to borrow
from its substantive due process jurisprudence, adding to takings law a
means-ends test in which the Court first examined the legitimacy of the
government objective and then asked how likely the regulation was to
45
achieve it.
Having blessed such an intrusive test with seemingly little thought,
the Court went on over the next decade to formulate two “categorical”
tests aimed at marking out zones of certainty. The first, set out in Loretto
v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., deemed a permanent physical
46
occupation—no matter how minor—a per se taking. The second,
adopted in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, deemed the
complete deprivation of the economic value of property a taking, unless
47
“background principles” of nuisance or property law justify the action.
In practice, neither categorical test did much to clarify takings law.
Lingle was decided in 2005 against this backdrop. The specific
occasion for Lingle was the repudiation of Agins’ “would-be” doctrinal
48
test. Lingle itself showed how intrusive means-ends scrutiny of
economic regulations can be. Scrupulously following Agins, the trial
40. Id. at 413–14.
41. Penn Cent. Trans. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
42. Id. at 124.
43. Id. See, e.g., Mark W. Cordes, Takings Jurisprudence as Three-Tiered Review, 20 J. Nat. Res.
& Envtl. L. 1, 1 (2006) (calling takings law before Lingle a “quagmire”).
44. Cf. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 531 (2005) (“On occasion, a would-be
doctrinal rule or test finds its way into our case law through simple repetition of a phrase—however
fortuitously coined.” (referring to Agins)).
45. 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980) (“The application of a general zoning law to particular property
effects a taking if the ordinance does not substantially advance legitimate state interests, or denies an
owner economically viable use of his land.” (citations omitted)).
46. 458 U.S. 419, 421 (1982).
47. 505 U.S. 1003, 1029 (1992).
48. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 531.
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court had essentially conducted a hearing on whether commercial rent
control was an effective policy response to rising gasoline prices—a
determination a unanimous Supreme Court realized should be the
49
province of the legislature.
Lingle, however, did more than consign Agins to the dustbin. Lingle
sought to reframe regulatory takings law in general, in a way that shrank
its concerns to a scope more compatible with democracy at the local and
national levels. As Justice O’Connor wrote for a unanimous Court, the
central aim of takings law is “to identify regulatory actions that are
functionally equivalent to the classic taking in which government directly
50
appropriates private property or ousts the owner from his domain.”
These actions fell into three categories.
The first, exemplified in Loretto, is a permanent physical invasion of
property. Taking over property is practically equivalent to eminent
domain, even when the government does not bother with the formal
transfer of title (and compensation) that attends it. The second,
exemplified in Lucas, is the complete elimination of the property’s value.
In a society where land is prized largely for its market value, an owner
who is left with bare title and undisturbed possession—but no more—has
suffered a loss very much like the classic taking, at least where the
regulation is not banning a nuisance. The third category, growing out of
Penn Central, is where the “magnitude of the regulation’s economic
impact and the degree to which it interferes with legitimate property
51
interests” requires compensation.
Lingle was plainly written to have bite. And it does. First, its
typology of takings is exhaustive. Lingle was all about trimming the list;
means-end scrutiny did not make the cut, nor did any other kind of
52
regulatory taking. Second, Lingle meant to narrow and focus the scope

49. Chevron had challenged as a taking a Hawaiian rent control statute limiting the rent that oil
companies could charge dealers leasing company-owned service stations. The purpose of the act was
to alleviate the effects of market concentration on gas prices paid by Hawaiian drivers at the pump.
The litigation included a day-long bench trial in which the judge heard opposing expert witnesses
disagree over whether oil companies would raise wholesale gasoline prices to offset the rent controls
imposed by the state, with the perverse result that retail gasoline prices would increase. As Justice
O’Connor noted in her opinion for the Court:
The Agins formula can be read to demand heightened means-ends review of virtually any
regulation of private property. If so interpreted, it would require courts to scrutinize the
efficacy of a vast array of state and federal regulation—a task for which courts are not well
suited. Moreover, it would empower—and might often require—courts to substitute their
predictive judgments for those of elected legislatures and expert agencies.
Id. at 544.
50. Id. at 539.
51. Id. at 540.
52. Although Lingle itself did not present it this way, there is arguably a fourth category,
involving exactions. Writing for a 5–4 majority in Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, Justice
Scalia pronounced it a taking for the state to require the Nollans, as a condition for a permit to build a
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of what remained on the list. Even though the three categories stem from
Loretto, Lucas, and Penn Central, the Court confined those tests to
actions that are “functionally equivalent to the classic taking,” a notably
circumscribed approach. Those tests govern to the extent they share the
53
“common touchstone” the Court identified —the functional equivalence
to a classic taking.
In short, Lingle constituted a major event in takings law: a
unanimous decision giving a comprehensive account of the area
grounded in institutional concerns about the proper role of the courts.
3. The Reveal: A New Takings Standard
a. Beach Renourishment and Takings Law
Seen in light of Lingle, the claim that there was somehow a taking
on the facts of Beach Renourishment—whether by the Florida statute or
54
the Florida Supreme Court—is remarkable. Beachfront property

much bigger house on their oceanfront lot, to grant a public easement across their property to improve
access to the public beach. 483 U.S. 825, 827–30 (1987). Citing Agins, the Court found the purpose
insufficiently related to the condition. Id. at 834–37. Similarly, in Dolan v. City of Tigard, the Court
found a taking where a city granted a store owner permission to expand the store and pave the parking
lot on the condition that she dedicate some of her land for a public greenway and pedestrian bicycle
path. 512 U.S. 374, 388–91 (1994). The Court faulted the lack of “rough proportionality” between the
means and ends. Id. at 391. As in Nollan, the Court cited Agins. Id. at 385.
One might think that Agins’ demise would cast doubt on these cases. In Lingle, however, the
Court expressly distinguished them, not because it wanted to preserve a role for the “substantially
advances” test, but because it viewed the exactions cases as:
a special application of the “doctrine of ‘unconstitutional conditions,’” which provides that
“the government may not require a person to give up a constitutional right—here the right
to receive just compensation when property is taken for a public use—in exchange for a
discretionary benefit conferred by the government where the benefit has little or no
relationship to the property.”
Lingle, 544 U.S. at 547 (quoting Dolan, 512 U.S. at 385).
The distinction is not entirely persuasive, and one may wonder whether, given Lingle’s
repudiation of the kind of means-ends scrutiny Nollan and Dolan employed, they should survive
Agins’ repudiation. See Daniel Pollak, Regulatory Takings: The Supreme Court Tries to Prune Agins
Without Stepping on Nollan and Dolan, 33 Ecology L.Q. 925 (2006); Lauren Reznick, Note, The
Death of Nollan and Dolan? Challenging the Constitutionality of Monetary Exactions in the Wake of
Lingle v. Chevron, 87 B.U. L. Rev. 725 (2007). At the very least, Nollan and Dolan should be applied
narrowly rather than broadly. See Timothy Mulvaney, The Remnants of Exactions Takings,
33 Environs Envtl. L. & Pol’y J. 189 (2010). But see Koontz v. St. Johns River Mgmt. Dist., 2012 WL
1966013 (2012) (cert. granted).
Whether one counts exactions cases as a fourth category, or as a particular application of
unconstitutional conditions doctrine, makes no difference to our analysis. What is important is that a
unanimous Court in Lingle gave an exhaustive list of the types of regulatory takings.
53. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 539.
54. See Michael B. Kent, More Questions than Answers: Situating Judicial Takings Within Existing
Regulatory Takings Doctrine, 29 Va. Envtl. L.J. 143, 160–66, 167 (2011) (“Had the legislature or an
administrative agency eliminated the right to accretions, Lingle would have governed the analysis
and . . . probably would have resulted in a decision for the government.”).

Doyle & Schnably_20 (S. Alessi) (Do Not Delete)

96

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

12/19/2012 3:02 PM

[Vol. 64:101

owners in the Florida Panhandle claimed that a state project to replenish
hurricane-depleted beaches fronting their property amounted to a
55
taking. Yet their parcels would remain undiminished and the public
would gain no rights of access to them. The only obvious difference
would be that after the restoration project, there would be a 75-foot
public sand beach fronting the landowners’ property. Having been
replenished at public expense, this beach would be open to the public.
In practical terms, the presence of an adjacent public beach seemed
56
to form the crux of the petitioners’ objection. However objectionable
this prospect might be to the landowners, it would seem far from
“functionally equivalent to the classic taking in which government
directly appropriates private property or ousts the owner from his
domain,” in Lingle’s terms. There was no physical invasion (Loretto); the
property had significant value (Lucas); and the beach restoration
program had been in effect for decades as a way to preserve a public
resource deemed vital under Florida’s constitution (Penn Central).
The legal argument put forth was of a different sort, however. The
property owners claimed that Florida had taken two specific, recognized
rights without compensation. The first was the right of accretion.
Beaches can build up (or erode) gradually over time, a process called
57
accretion (or reliction). When accretion occurs, the sandy beach
expands seaward, pushing the mean high water line—the point the high
tide reaches on average—seaward as well. This process has practical
significance for beachfront property owners. Florida law sets the mean
high water line as the boundary between privately owned beachfront
land and the public part of the beach. Thus, if there is accretion, the
boundary between the private and public portions of the beach will shift
seaward. Consequently, under Florida law, where there is accretion to
58
the shoreline, a beachfront property owner’s land expands in size.

55. Where the beach has eroded significantly over time through either process, local governments
tend to support beach restoration to protect tourism and coastal properties. See Eric C.F. Bird, Beach
Management 134–37 (1996).Various techniques may be used; a common one involves dredging sand
from further out the shore and depositing it on the wet sand portion of the beach. See id. at 162–88;
C.W. Finkl & H.J. Walker, Beach Nourishment, in Engineered Coasts 1, 1–22 (Jiyu Chen et al., eds.,
2002). Though beach nourishment is a widely accepted technique, see H.J. Walker & C.W. Finkl,
Beach Renourishment: Case Studies, in Engineered Coasts, supra, at 56, it can be expensive and may
have adverse environmental impacts. See Bird, supra, at 201–10; Karl F. Nordstrom, Beach and
Dune Restoration 24–36 (2008). The plaintiffs in Beach Renourishment do not, however, seem to
have been motivated by these concerns.
56. Transcript of Oral Argument at 9–14, 46, Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of
Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592 (2010) (No. 08-1151) (colloquy about the hypothetical prospect of the
state allowing a hot dog vendor to operate on beach behind petitioners’ houses).
57. For a thoughtful account of the history of accretion and avulsion as legal terms, together with
an assessment for their relevance in the face of climate change, see Joseph L. Sax, The
Accretion/Avulsion Puzzle: Its Past Revealed, Its Future Proposed, 23 Tul. Envtl. L.J. 305 (2010).
58. Walton Cnty. v. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc., 998 So. 2d 1102, 1111, 1112–14 (Fla.
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Of course changes are not necessarily gradual. The contours of a
beach can also be dramatically changed overnight by major events like
hurricanes, a process called avulsion. Under Florida law, as under many
59
other states’ laws, when avulsion occurs the boundary remains unchanged.
The second claimed taking was of an alleged right that the property
have direct contact with the water. Once the restoration was completed,
there would now be a publicly owned dry sand beach between their
property and the Gulf. Their access (physical and visual) to the water
would continue unhindered, but the water would no longer lap up against
their property at high tide.
The plaintiffs first charged that it was the Florida Beach and Shore
60
Preservation Act that took these two rights. In connection with the
restoration of the beach, the statute would permanently fix the line
between the public and private portions of the beach at what had been
the mean high water line over the last two decades. With the boundary
line now immovable, the property owners would lose any chance of
61
gaining new land due to accretion. This loss, they claimed, was a taking.
Equally a taking, they claimed, was the loss of direct contact with the
water, now that a public dry sand beach would stand between them and
the water.
The Florida Supreme Court rejected the plaintiffs’ claim. It was not
that the statute in fact preserved the alleged rights. Rather, the court
ruled after an extensive analysis of Florida common law that the
property owners had no such rights in the first place. In the context of
beach restoration, the right of accretion was a contingent right, the court
held, not a full property right. It also ruled that the right of contact with
the water was merely ancillary to the beachfront owner’s right of access
62
to the water, which remained unimpeded.
The property owners now asserted that the Florida Supreme Court
itself had taken their property by finding that the common law did not
recognize the rights they claimed the Florida statute had taken. They first
petitioned the Florida Supreme Court for rehearing, which summarily
63
denied the motion, and then sought review by the Supreme Court.
The Court did not endorse a judicial takings doctrine, but as noted
the plurality readily took on that task. It began with a nod to Lingle’s

2008).
59. Id. at 1114.
60. 1961 Fla. Laws ch. 61–246 (codified as amended at Fla. Stat. §§ 161.011–.45 (2012)).
61. Of course, accompanying the loss of the benefit accretion was the loss of the risk of erosion
over time. With erosion, a property owner’s house might end up on the sandy beach a short distance
from the water.
62. Walton Cnty., 998 So. 2d at 1118–20.
63. Walton Cnty. v. Stop the Beach Renourishment Inc., No. SC06-1447, 2008 Fla. LEXIS 2483,
at *1 (Fla. Dec. 18, 2008).
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three categories. But it went on to stake out another category not
mentioned in Lingle: elimination of an established property right. As
Justice Scalia put it, “[i]f a legislature or a court declares that what was
once an established right of private property no longer exists, it has taken
65
that property.”
b. Adding a New Category to Lingle
Although the plurality did not acknowledge it, there is no doubt that
its proposed test amounts to an addition to Lingle and the Court’s case
66
law. Three features of this new category stand out. First, it
wholeheartedly embraces “conceptual severance.” In this approach, the
impact of the regulation on the property owner is not measured against
the parcel as a whole, or its value as a whole. The owner’s rights are
broken down into the sticks in the bundle, and it is the impact of the
67
regulation on a given stick that counts. A conceptual severance
approach makes the “denominator” smaller (at least conceptually) and
could trigger many more Lucas-based claims of a complete elimination
of value, even where the overall value of a parcel of land remained
68
relatively intact. In 1987, the Court firmly rejected this approach, holding

64. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592, 2601 (2010).
65. Id. at 2602 (emphasis omitted); see id. at 2601 (“States effect a taking if they recharacterize as
public property what was previously private property.”). Cf. Luke A. Wake, Pacific Legal Found., Can
States
Redefine
Property
Rights?,
PLF
Liberty
Blog,
(Jan.
20,
2010),
http://plf.typepad.com/plf/2010/01/can-states-redefine-property-rights.html (arguing, while Beach
Renourishment was pending, that the Court should add another category to the Lingle catalog).
66. The plurality presented this proposed new category—elimination of an established property
right—as if it were simply taking note of a prior case, Webb’s Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith,
449 U.S. 155, 163–65 (1980). But there is no doubt that in fact, the plurality’s proposed test amounts to
an addition to Lingle and the Court’s case law. For one thing, one can search in vain within Lingle’s
summary of takings law for any hint of such a category. Equally important is Lingle’s admonition that
takings are actions that are practically equivalent to physically ousting a property owner or taking over
the owner’s ownership of the property. Webb’s Fabulous Pharmacies fits that admonition quite well:
Under the Florida statute at issue in that case, individuals forfeited all interest earned on funds
deposited in court. Id. at 161; see Brown v. Legal Found. of Wash., 538 U.S. 216 (2003); Phillips v.
Wash. Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156 (1998). Beach Renourishment—the occasion for the recognition of
this new category—involved nothing like the alleged deprivation in Webb’s Fabulous Pharmacies.
Beachfront property owners were not ousted from their land, nor was their title threatened; nor was
any easement created on their land.
67. See Richard A. Epstein, Taking by Slivers, Nat’l L.J., May 6, 2002, at A21 (criticizing the
Court’s decision in Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg. Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 331
(2002): “[Justice] Stevens fell into the regrettable trap of assuming that the test of whether property is
taken is directed more to what the owner retains and less to what he has lost . . . . But this rule only
inspires the government to take property in slivers . . . .”); see also Barros, supra note 4, at 1869–72
(1995); James S. Burling, Private Property Rights and the Environment After Palazzolo, 30 B.C. Envt’l
Aff. L. Rev. 1, 50—64 (2002). To some extent Justice Rehnquist’s dissent in Penn Central anticipated
this approach, with his rejection of the balancing test in favor of viewing the regulation as imposing a
servitude on the owner. For a critique, see Timothy J. Dowling, On History, Takings Jurisprudence,
and Palazzolo: A Reply to James Burling, 30 B.C. Envt’l Aff. L. Rev. 1, 65, 95–99 (2002).
68. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 500–02 (1987). In Keystone, a
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that “our takings jurisprudence forecloses reliance on such legalistic
69
distinctions within a bundle of property rights.”
Second, the new category would target changes in the law without
any showing of overall effect on the property said to have been taken.
70
Gauging changes in the law against the Takings Clause is nothing new.
What the three Lingle categories have in common, however, is that they
require some showing of the impact on the property owner of the
changed legal situation. For Penn Central takings, the “economic impact
of the regulation on the claimant,” as well as the impact on the claimant’s
71
“investment-backed expectations,” is an important part of the test. For
72
Lucas, the key is the complete elimination of value. Even for Loretto,
what counts is the particular type of effect on the owner—physical
73
displacement. In contrast, the test the Beach Renourishment plurality
coal mining company forced by a Pennsylvania statute to leave some of its coal in the ground to
prevent subsidence argued that under Pennsylvania property law, the “support estate” was a separate
property interest. Id. at 475–78. All of the value of this estate, the company argued, had been taken.
Id.
69. Id. at 500. One might argue that the plurality was merely following the lead of the Florida
Supreme Court, which has made clear that it regards certain sticks in a beachfront property owner’s
bundle (for example, the right of access to the water) as separately protectable. See Walton Cnty. v.
Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc., 998 So. 2d 1102, 1111 (Fla. 2008). Of course, a state may extend
takings protection under its own constitution more broadly than that under the federal constitution.
But simply because a state regards a particular stick as distinct from the rest of the bundle, to date at
least it has not followed that that stick would be separately protected under the Takings Clause. On
the contrary, Pennsylvania law recognized the support estate as a separate estate, but that did not stop
the Court from rejecting conceptual severance in Keystone in favor of a Penn Central analysis.
70. It happens all the time: A legislature or agency approves a new regulation that changes
property owners’ rights, and the property owners assert that the new regulation amounts to a taking.
Indeed, even the classic physical invasion and occupation by the state amounts to a change in the law
as applied to the property owner, for it signals that the state will not respect and enforce the property
owner’s rights to the parcel (or at least not the right to exclude).
71. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
72. Lucas v. S. Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1030 (1991).
73. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 435–36 (1982). For a view
that Beach Renourishment could be analogized to Loretto, see John R. Nolon & Kristen M. Grzan,
Rising Tides-Changing Title: Walton County v. Stop the Beach Renourishment, 38 Real Estate L.J.
392, 404 (2009). Equating physical occupation with the loss of an intangible right, however, is
inconsistent with Lingle’s admonition that regulatory takings involve government action “functionally
equivalent to the classic taking in which government directly appropriates private property or ousts
the owner from his domain.” Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., 544 U.S. 528, 539 (2005). Granted, at times the
Court has expressed concern for one stick in the bundle—the right to exclude—in a way that might
suggest that a state could never take it without compensation. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S.
164, 176, 179–80 (1979). In Kaiser, the Court called the right to exclude an “essential” stick in the
bundle and found a taking. Id. But the Court still applied the Penn Central test, taking the deprivation
of the right to exclude into account as a particularly important factor, to be sure, but still a factor in the
evaluation of the overall impact. Id. at 178.
Another example might be the right to inherit. Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 716 (1987)
(involving a federal statute denying the right to inherit to highly fractionated ownership interests in
individual allotments of Native American land); id. (“[T]he regulation here amounts to virtually the
abrogation of the right to pass on a certain type of property—the small undivided interest—to one’s
heirs. In one form or another, the right to pass on property—to one’s family in particular—has been
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proposed disregards effect—or, what amounts to the same thing, defines
the change in the law as the effect. The whole analysis of Florida law in
the plurality opinion simply ignores the question of the economic impact
on the property owners.
Third, there is no “override” in this new category as there was in
Lucas, which held that even if there was a total deprivation of value, the
government action still might not be a taking if it was justified by
74
background principles of property law. Under the Beach Renourishment
plurality, in contrast, if an established right is found to have been
75
eliminated, that is the end of the inquiry. Whereas Justice Kennedy
would grant the state courts some leeway to change the common law in
76
light of changing social or technological factors, the plurality provides
no such defense. This omission accounts for the head-scratching quality
of the claim before the Court—beachfront property owners complained
that using public funds to restore the beach adjacent to their lots
77
amounted to a taking.
c.

The Impact of the New Category

The new Beach Renourishment category would subsume all the other
categories, and radically change takings law. The rewrite would start with
Pennsylvania Coal. That case would end the same way, but with a radically
different approach, one that would leave no room for consideration of the
importance of the government’s interests. The mining company would
simply argue that it had an “established right” to mine the coal, pointing
to the deed and to Pennsylvania’s recognition of a separate “support
estate” that it still owned. Then it would show that the statute had the
effect of abolishing that right as to the mining company. It would not
need to show that there was little public interest involved in its case,
something Justice Holmes had taken pains to argue. Nor would it need to
show that the right it lost was “very valuable.” Neither plays any role in
78
the Beach Renourishment test.
part of the Anglo-American legal system since feudal times.”). Here, too, the Court was careful to
point out that for some holders of the fractionated interests, the value could be as much as $2,700,
which was not “trivial,” and as to others it might cause the “escheat of potentially valuable timber and
mineral interests.” Id. at 714.
74. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1029.
75. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592, 2602 (2010).
76. Id. at 2616 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
77. To be sure, the project would have an impact on them—there would be beach-goers behind
their lots, maybe even hot dog vendors. See supra note 56, at 9–16. But these possibilities did not
constitute the basis for their legal claim, and they would certainly fail under Penn Central, Lucas, or
Loretto as a taking.
78. Similarly, the four dissenting conservative justices in Keystone would now prevail. The
argument the takings claimant would make would somewhat track Chief Justice Rehnquist’s dissent:
“Operation of [the statute] extinguishes petitioners’ interests in their support estates, making
worthless what they purchased as a separate right under Pennsylvania law.” Keystone Bituminous
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Andrus v. Allard would be in question now. In that case the Court
rejected a takings challenge to a federal statute forbidding the sale of
80
eagle feathers and other artifacts. The Court noted that the statute had
caused the “destruction of one ‘strand’ of the bundle” of property
81
rights—the right to sell. But it left owners of the artifacts with the other
strands (“the rights to possess and transport their property, and to
82
donate or devise”), which had some value, though of uncertain
83
amount. While this case involved a federal statute, the analysis would
be the same: An established right—the right to sell the bird artifacts—
84
was eliminated by the federal statute.
85
Finally, consider Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, sometimes
regarded as a precursor to judicial takings doctrine. The California
Supreme Court had interpreted the California Constitution to protect
86
free speech and petition rights in private shopping malls. In reaching
87
that decision, it overruled an earlier opinion holding the opposite. A
mall owner asserted that it had suffered a taking. In rejecting the claim,
Justice Rehnquist began by saying that “there has literally been a
‘taking’” of the right to exclude to the extent that the shopping center
88
had lost the right to exclude the protesters. Under the Beach
Renourishment approach, that would be the end of the matter: The right
to exclude had previously been established (through the now overruled
California Supreme Court opinion) and now was eliminated. Missing
would be any need to go into the Penn Central factors that Justice
Rehnquist found to support a finding that there had not been a taking.
The impact on the mall and its value would be fairly restricted, and the
mall was already open to the public, undermining any “reasonable
89
investment-backed expectation” of an unlimited right to exclude.

Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 520 (1987). We note, however, that the Beach
Renourishment test goes even further than this. Chief Justice Rehnquist did, after all, include the
following proviso: “[W]here the estate defined by state law is both severable and of value in its own
right, it is appropriate to consider the effect of regulation on that particular property interest.” Id. As
we have pointed out, nothing in the Beach Renourishment test turns on the value of the right lost.
79. 444 U.S. 51 (1979).
80. Id. at 67–68.
81. Id. at 66.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 67–68.
85. 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
86. Id. at 78.
87. See id.
88. Id. at 82.
89. Id. at 82–83. Pruneyard has been sharply criticized by property right advocates as unwarranted judicial activism. See, e.g., Stanley H. Friedelbaum, Private Property, Public Property: Shopping
Centers and Expressive Freedom in the States, 62 Alb. L. Rev. 1229 (1999); Gregory C. Sisk, Returning
to the Pruneyard: The Unconstitutionality of State-Sanctioned Trespass in the Name of Speech, 32 Harv.
J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 389 (2009).
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One need not review the Court’s entire body of takings cases to
appreciate the sweep of the Beach Renourishment test. It could be
breathtaking. The plurality’s test looks to a “right” established by state
90
law. But what is a right? At one extreme, it could be the particular
exercise of any general power that state law gives property owners. For
example, while no state would ever eliminate “the right to exclude” as
such, it might “eliminate” that right as to particular circumstances (as in
Pruneyard). Using this approach in connection with the Beach
Renourishment test would make it almost impossible for any state to
enact new regulations. Anything a property owner could do before the
regulation was enacted could be called a right, and then the right to do
whatever was forbidden or lost under the new regulation would have
91
been eliminated.
Of course, takings law is notorious for its history of tests that
seemingly presage significant restrictions on the regulation of property,
but turn out to have little bite. If Beach Renourishment’s surreptitious
test were put into practice, might it turn out to be similarly limited?
Perhaps it could be confined to cases where the loss of an established
right inures to the benefit of the government or the public, rather than to
another private individual. One can find a hint of this approach in the
plurality opinion. In passing, it referred to a narrower standard by which
only the elimination of an established private right in favor of public
92
rights would be covered. This kind of distinction might save
Pennsylvania Coal; Justice Holmes’ opinion treats the regulation as
essentially benefiting the private interest of the homeowner at the
expense of another private entity, the mining company.
Perhaps it is the sheer vacuousness of this distinction in the context
of the Takings Clause that accounts for the plurality’s failure to give it
more than a passing reference. We will eschew a lengthy (and dreary)
exegesis of the impossibility of making the kind of sharp distinction
between public and private that this limitation would require, and
confine ourselves to two examples. Consider Pennsylvania Coal itself.
Even Justice Holmes, who thought that “in ordinary private affairs the
public interest does not warrant much” public interference, conceded,

90. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592, 2612 (2010).
91. See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg. Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 331 (2002)
(rejecting a claim that a thirty-two month moratorium on development constituted a total deprivation
of value for that period); see also id. (“Of course, defining the property interest taken in terms of the
very regulation being challenged is circular. With property so divided, every delay would become a
total ban; the moratorium and the normal permit process alike would constitute categorical takings.”).
Justice Stevens went on to note that this “‘conceptual severance’ argument is unavailing because it
ignores Penn Central’s admonition that in regulatory takings cases we must focus on ‘the parcel as a
whole.’” Id. (quoting Penn Cent. Trans. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 130–31 (1978)).
92. See Beach Renourishment, 130 S. Ct. at 2601 (“States effect a taking if they recharacterize as
public property what was previously private property.”).
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“[n]o doubt there is a public interest” even in the “case of a single private
93
house.” And what are we to make of Pruneyard? Would that be the
case of transferring a right (to exclude) from one private owner to other
private parties (the protesters, in whose hands the right would be a right
of entry)? Or would it be a case of eliminating the right to exclude, as to
protesters, in order to benefit the public through the exercise of free
speech rights? Obviously, it could be characterized either way. The
difficulties are not just logical, moreover. Limiting the Beach
Renourishment test to cases of “private to public” transfers is utterly
94
inconsistent with the central holding of Kelo v. City of New London,
which recognized that the transfer of private property from one private
95
party to another could serve a public interest.
In short, the plurality’s approach employs a major sleight of hand.
Distracted by the back and forth over the institutional question—can a
state court commit a taking?—we may somehow fail to notice the major
rewrite of takings law embodied in the proposed test. Granted, a major
96
rewrite of takings law is not intrinsically bad. But smuggling it in is.
B. Feigned Obliviousness
The plurality’s sleight of hand is matched by its feigned
obliviousness to a question the Court has made central to constitutional
jurisprudence in the last decade and a half: federalism.
The text of the Fifth Amendment, the plurality argued, is written in
the passive voice, and “is not addressed to the action of a specific branch
97
or branches.” There is something to be said for paying close attention to
the text, in contrast to the general practice of courts and commentators
(ourselves included) in applying a mythic “Takings Clause” that

93. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922).
94. 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
95. Id. at 488–489. Another potential limitation would be equally unavailing. Perhaps only rights
that are severable are rights that can be “established” under state law for this purpose. If so, the
impact of the Beach Renourishment test might be somewhat limited. There is nothing in the holding,
however, to so suggest. In fact, even if the alleged rights of accretion and contact with the water
existed, it is not clear whether they would be severable under Florida law. See Belvedere Dev. Corp. v.
Dep’t of Transp., 476 So. 2d 649, 652 (Fla.1985) (riparian rights not severable in condemnation
context).
96. Whether Lingle can in fact provide the clarity so lacking in regulatory takings law remains to
be seen (at least if it is not undermined so soon after its birth). Cf. Byrne, supra note 3, at 637 (“[Beach
Renourishment] highlights deep and pervasive problems with the regulatory takings doctrine
generally.”). There is no shortage of proposals for fundamental rewrites of takings law, even after
Lingle. The need for a major rewrite so soon after the Court’s unanimous statement in Lingle is not,
however, immediately apparent. Some good might come from serious attention to Lingle’s stringent
admonition that only state action functionally equivalent to the classic taking could amount to a
regulatory taking.
97. Beach Renourishment, 130 S. Ct. at 2601.
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combines both the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. But in fact, the
conclusions to be drawn from a textual analysis are quite unclear, as
might be expected from the plurality’s resort to “common sense” to
99
support them. The Court has not consistently placed weight on the
100
specification of institutional actors in other provisions.
Here the plurality made a passing reference to federalism, arguing
that it dictates that the Court not favor one branch of state government
over another. State legislatures and executive bodies are subject to the
101
Why the
Takings Clause, and state courts should be as well.
Constitution treats state courts differently from other state agencies in
the context of the Tenth Amendment, for example, was left
102
unaddressed.
This appeal to federalism was more Freudian slip than serious
argument. In fact, the proposed new test is in serious tension with
federalism in two ways not mentioned at all in the plurality opinion. One
is its adoption of new federal oversight of an area previously left to the
states; the other is an institutional tension with federalism implicit in the
plurality’s virtual elimination of state legislatures from any role in
property definition.
1. The Substantive Tension with Federalism
103

For sixty years before United States v. Lopez, the Court largely left
the question of the balance between federal and state power to the
98. Frank Michelman expresses this tendency well: “Clauses in the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments command, in effect, that governments in this country shall pay for any property they
may take from private owners. By settled usage, we call this constitutional command the Takings
Clause.” Frank I. Michelman, Property, Federalism, and Jurisprudence: A Comment on Lucas and
Judicial Conservatism, 35 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 301, 308 (1993). Not surprisingly, the conclusions to be
drawn from a textual analysis do not necessarily accord with the plurality’s. For example, two
commentators closely analyzing the text and original intent conclude (through rather different
analyses) that the whole doctrine of regulatory takings has a firm grounding when it comes to the
states, but not the federal government. See Michael B. Rappaport, Originalism and Regulatory
Takings: Why the Fifth Amendment May Not Protect Against Regulatory Takings, but the Fourteenth
Amendment May, 45 San Diego L. Rev. 729, 758 (2008); Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, The Objects of
the Constitution, 63 Stan. L. Rev. 1005, 1044–46, 1066–67 (2011).
99. Beach Renourishment, 130 S. Ct. at 2601.
100. The Court has declined to limit the First Amendment to actions by Congress. See Mark P.
Denbeaux, The First Word of the First Amendment, 80 Nw. U.L. Rev. 1156 (1986); Nicholas Quinn
Rosenkranz, The Subjects of the Constitution, 62 Stan. L. Rev. 1209, 1222 n.38 (2010). On the other
hand, despite an earlier suggestion otherwise, see Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 353–54
(1963), it ruled the Ex Post Facto Clause inapplicable to state courts, in part because the text is
addressed to legislatures, see Rogers v. Tennessee, 532 U.S. 451, 456–62 (2001).
101. Beach Renourishment, 130 S. Ct. at 2602.
102. The federal government can commandeer state courts (that is, require them to hear federal
claims), but it cannot commandeer state legislatures or officials. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S.
898 (1997) (officials); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (legislatures); Testa v. Katt, 330
U.S. 386 (1947) (courts).
103. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
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political process. In Lopez, the Court held a federal statute forbidding
the possession of guns in school zones to be beyond Congress’s
105
Commerce Clause power. Five years later it struck down a provision of
the Violence Against Women Act providing victims of domestic violence
106
with a federal remedy, again on federalism grounds.
One aspect of Lopez and subsequent cases has been the Court’s
adoption of an “economic activity” test under the Commerce Clause. If
an activity is not an economic one, the Court will likely not uphold
federal power over it, treating the aggregate effect of that activity as
107
insubstantial. A second aspect—directly on point here—is that where
an activity is one that states have traditionally handled, that fact will
count heavily against federal power over it. What are these areas? In
Lopez, the Court referred to “criminal law enforcement” and
108
“education” as areas “where States historically have been sovereign.”
In Morrison, it referred to “family law and other areas of traditional state
109
regulation.”
This component of the Court’s federalism jurisprudence raises an
obvious problem for judicial takings. The definition and delineation of
property rights have long been seen as state concerns. Indeed, the
“brooding omnipresence” of the common law before Erie Railroad Co. v.
110
Tompkins did not extend to property law. As Justice Rehnquist
observed thirty-five years ago, “even when federal common law was in its

104. Even the major exception to this observation, Nat’l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833
(1976) (holding that the Tenth Amendment bars application of a federal labor wage and hour statute
to state and local employees), was overruled within a decade. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro.
Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 550 (1985) (“[T]he principal means chosen by the Framers to ensure the
role of the States in the federal system lies in the structure of the Federal Government itself.”).
105. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 551.
106. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 618–19 (2000). The Court’s “federalism revolution”
has had its limits. In Gonzalez v. Raich, the Court upheld federal law criminalizing the home
cultivation and consumption of marijuana. 545 U.S. 1, 32–33 (2005). In United States v. Comstock, it
upheld federal power to subject federal sex offenders to civil commitment after the date of their
scheduled prison release. 130 S. Ct. 1949, 1965 (2010). These decisions do not, however, signal the end
of the revolution. In both Raich and Comstock the Court was deeply split. In National Federation of
Independent Business v. Sebelius, the Court upheld the individual mandate but declined to do so under
the Commerce Clause, and also found that the way Congress had structured the Medicaid expansion
violated federalism limits. 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2584–93 (2012) (Roberts, C.J.) (rejecting the Commerce
Clause as a basis for the mandate); id. at 2644–50 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, Alito, JJ., dissenting)
(same); id. at 2594 (Roberts, C.J.) (upholding the taxing power as the basis for the mandate); id. at
2666 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, Alito, JJ., dissenting) (“Seven Members of the Court agree that the
Medicaid Expansion, as enacted by Congress, is unconstitutional.”).
107. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 609–13.
108. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 564.
109. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 615.
110. 304 U.S. 64 (1938). See S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting)
(“The common law is not a brooding omnipresence in the sky but the articulate voice of some
sovereign or quasi-sovereign that can be identified . . . .”).
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111

heyday under the teachings of Swift v. Tyson, an exception was carved
112
out for the local law of real property.”
Of course, one can imagine some attempts to reconcile the two had
the plurality seen fit to address the tension. Perhaps the concerns that
have led the Court to constrain federal power when it comes to
legislation simply do not apply to the Supreme Court because it is not a
political body. In his concurrence in Lopez, for example, Justice
Kennedy emphasized that if federal and state power overlapped too
113
much, voters would not know whom to hold accountable. Courts are
not expected to be politically accountable. A major problem with this
distinction, though, is Beach Renourishment itself: The plurality scoffed
at the argument that state courts should be treated differently from other
state agencies, at least when it comes to the Takings Clause. Why should
the Supreme Court be treated differently from Congress when it comes
114
to federal intervention into areas previously left to states?
Perhaps federalism concerns are out of place in any individual rights
case. This, too, is far from obvious. When the Court reinstated the death
penalty in 1976, it cited considerations of “federalism, as well as respect
for the ability of a legislature to evaluate, in terms of its particular State,
115
the moral consensus concerning the death penalty.” And Kelo shows
that federalism is highly relevant to the interpretation of the Takings
116
Clause. The Court took pains to note that one factor in its refusal to
adopt a narrow reading of the “public use” requirement of eminent
domain was that adopting a broader reading would leave the states with
117
flexibility to determine the scope of eminent domain.

111. 41 U.S. 1 (1842).
112. Or. ex rel. State Land Bd. v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co., 429 U.S. 363, 378–79 (1977)
(Rehnquist, J.) (citation to Swift omitted); see id. at 378 (“The great body of law in this country which
controls acquisition, transmission, and transfer of property, and defines the rights of its owners in
relation to the state or to private parties, is found in the statutes and decisions of the state.” (quoting
Davies Warehouse Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 144, 155 (1944))).
113. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 576–77 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
114. It is not a sufficient answer to say that the federalism cases have concerned the Commerce
Clause while Beach Renourishment concerned the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Federalism
concerns extend beyond the Commerce Clause. The Court has found them in the Tenth and Eleventh
Amendments as well. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (Tenth Amendment); Seminole
Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (Eleventh Amendment); New York v. United States, 505
U.S. 144 (1992) (Tenth Amendment).
115. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 186–87 (1976) (Stewart, Powell, Stevens, JJ.); id. at 176
(referring to the “deference we owe to the decisions of state legislatures under our federal system”);
see Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 369–70 (1989) (citing Gregg for the relevance of federalism to
the Eighth Amendment), overruled on other grounds by Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S 551 (2005); see
also Bond v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2355, 2364 (2011) (“Federalism also protects the liberty of all
persons within a State . . . .”).
116. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 489–90 (2005).
117. Id.
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To be sure, we do not argue that federalism necessarily precludes
118
the creation of the new Beach Renourishment category. But we do
insist that obliviousness—so pointed that it is hard to see it as
119
inadvertent—is no way to deal with the issue.
2. The Institutional Tension with Federalism
Commentators have noted the substantive tension with federalism,
but they have overlooked a more subtle, yet equally important, tension.
There is an institutional dimension to federalism. The Court has long
taken the position that it is not for the federal government to decide how
state governments should be structured or what powers each branch
120
should have. Yet the clear import of the plurality’s approach to parsing
Florida law is to write state legislatures out of any participation in the
definition and delineation of property rights. Not only has a new takings
standard been smuggled in, but so has a major diminution of the role of
state legislatures in the making of property law. Here, too, the plurality is
seemingly oblivious to the federalism implications of its approach.
This hidden shift in power at the state level stems from the
plurality’s refusal to recognize that property law is a joint enterprise
between state legislatures and courts, one in which common law and
statutory law are thoroughly intertwined. The plurality’s failure to
recognize this is manifested in the way its version of Florida property law
differs from the Florida Supreme Court’s.
a. Property Law Making as a Joint Enterprise Between State
Courts and Legislatures
One aspect of the joint enterprise is that state courts’ supervision and
management of the common law amount to a form of lawmaking, one that

118. After all, respect for state authority is not an absolute constitutional value (as Raich shows).
Perhaps federal intervention into the definition and delineation of property rights is justified even at
some cost to federalism. We note, however, that it is largely the more conservative members of the
Court—well represented in the Beach Renourishment plurality—who have most strongly endorsed the
federalism limits on Congressional power.
119. One might respond that we take the Court’s expressions of concern for federalism too
seriously. Cf. Frank B. Cross, Realism About Federalism, 74 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1304, 1309 (1999)
(“[J]udges invoke the doctrine selectively to promote policy objectives.”). This may be a sensible
response for an academic, but not for the Court.
120. See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460 (1991) (“Through the structure of its
government . . . a State defines itself as a sovereign.”); Highland Farms Dairy v. Agnew, 300 U.S. 608, 612
(1937) (rejecting a challenge to a Virginia statute on the ground that it unlawfully delegated legislative
power to an executive agency: “How power shall be distributed by a state among its governmental organs
is commonly, if not always, a question for the state itself.”); see also Arizonans for Official English v.
Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 65 (1997) (finding no authority in Arizona law for initiative proponents to appeal
a district court judgment); Morgan v. S. Bend Cmty. Sch. Corp., 797 F.2d 471, 477 (7th Cir. 1986)
(“[T]he Court has not held that Congress may decide who within a state’s government has the
authority to act on behalf of that government.”).
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can be hard to distinguish from legislative lawmaking. There is nothing
addressed by the common law that could not equally be addressed by
statute. Courts and legislatures may differ on grounds of democratic
accountability and expertise, but it is very hard to distinguish their
actions in principle.
121
Take the well-known case of State v. Shack. The New Jersey
Supreme Court held that property rights “serve human values. They are
122
recognized to that end, and are limited by it.” It concluded that a
migrant farm owner could not exclude government-funded attorneys and
123
medical workers seeking to assist migrant farm workers. Moreover, the
court delineated the contours of the right of access, holding that
reporters but not those selling goods had access, and recognizing the
right of the farm owner to set reasonable conditions on entry (such as a
124
requirement that anyone entering the farm provide identification).
There is no reason, however, why these issues must be handled only by
the courts. Other states have addressed the question through legislation
that sets similar (though not identical) parameters to the right of access
to migrant farms. Florida’s statute governing access to migrant farms, for
example, covers much of the same ground as State v. Shack, though its
125
scope and content differ from Shack on some points.
A second characteristic of this joint enterprise is that state
lawmaking involves a good deal of interaction between courts and
legislatures. Legislatures can overrule or modify common law
126
decisions. A judicial decision is final in a particular case, but as to the
general issues it decides, it is in fact never final, given this possibility.
Many state legislatures (and governors) systematically monitor judicial
127
decisions to determine whether a legislative response is needed.
Moreover, much of the common law is determined in a legislative
context, with courts taking legislative policy into account. While State v.
Shack reads much like a common law opinion, in fact the task before the
Court was to interpret the state trespass statute.
A third characteristic of the joint enterprise is that much of the
interaction involves deference by courts to legislatures (or state
constitutions). For example, in limiting the farm owner’s right to exclude
medical workers, lawyers, and others (or should we perhaps say, in
“eliminating” the right to exclude them), State v. Shack did not treat the
121. 277 A.2d 369 (N.J. 1971).
122. Id. at 372.
123. Id. at 374.
124. Id.
125. See Fla. Stat. Ann. §§ 381.008–.00897 (2011).
126. Judith S. Kaye, Things Judges Do: State Statutory Interpretation, 13 Touro L. Rev. 595, 602
(1997).
127. Shirley S. Abrahamson & Robert L. Hughes, Shall We Dance? Steps for Legislators and
Judges in Statutory Interpretation, 75 Minn. L. Rev. 1045, 1054–59 (1991).
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common law in isolation. It discussed in some detail the report of the
New Jersey Governor’s task force on migrant farmworkers, as well as
federal legislation, and put significant weight on the legislative policy of
assisting migrant farmworkers, which an absolute right to exclude would
128
defeat.
This deference is typical in cases involving beach access. Consider
the Oregon Supreme Court’s handling of the public’s right of access to
beaches in State ex rel. Thornton v. Hay, decided in 1969—and which a
129
quarter century later still provoked the ire of Justice Scalia. When a
motel owner attempted to close the dry sand beach on its property to
everyone but its guests, an Oregon trial court ruled that the public had
130
acquired a prescriptive easement to use it. The Oregon Supreme Court
affirmed but rested its holding instead on the English doctrine of
131
custom. The court noted that “[s]trictly construed, prescription applies
only to the specific tract of land before the court, and doubtful
prescription cases could fill the courts for years with tract-by-tract
132
Going over the doctrine of custom as laid out by
litigation.”
Blackstone, which it found to be part of Oregon law, the court ruled that
the “custom of the people of Oregon to use the dry-sand area of the
beaches for public recreational purposes meets every one of Blackstone’s
133
requisites.”
134
In reaching this result, the court took note of legislative policy.
While it did not rest its decision on prescriptive easement grounds, it
went out of its way to hold that such easements in favor of the public
were in fact possible under Oregon law, referring to an Oregon statute that
codified “a policy favoring the acquisition by prescription of public
135
recreational easements in beach lands.” Among other things, that statute
provided that it is in the public interest to do whatever is necessary to
preserve and protect scenic and recreational use of Oregon’s ocean
136
shore. Interestingly, the court made clear that a statute of this sort could

128. Shack, 277 A.2d at 372–373.
129. 462 P.2d 671 (Ore. 1969). On Justice Scalia’s views, see infra Part I.C.2.
130. As is common in other states, the mean high water line marked the divide between publicly
and privately owned property on shore. The “wet sand” beach below the mean high water land was
publicly owned; the “dry sand” beach—the area from the mean high water line landward to the point
where vegetation could grow—was part of the beachfront owners’ property. In practice, many
beachgoers treated the entire beach, up to the vegetation line, as open to public use. Thornton, 462
P.2d at 673–75.
131. Id. at 678.
132. Id. at 676.
133. Id. at 677.
134. Id. at 674.
135. Id. at 676. (citing Or. Rev. Stat. § 390.610 (1994)).
136. Or. Rev. Stat. § 390.610(4) (1994).
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not, of course, “create public rights at the expense of a private
137
landowner,” it was quite relevant to the construction of the common law.
Courts in other states have shown similar deference to legislative
policy in delineating the public trust doctrine. For example, in deciding
that the public trust doctrine today protects public access not just for the
older common law purposes of navigation and fishing, but also for
recreational purposes, the New Jersey Supreme Court relied in part on a
New Jersey statute that authorized the transfer of tidal properties to
governmental bodies that maintained public parks fronting the beach,
but only so long as the park remained open to the public. The court took
the statute as evincing a legislative policy to encourage access to
138
beaches.
In California, the Supreme Court faced the question whether certain
privately owned shoreline properties in Santa Cruz had been dedicated
139
to public use over the years. Among other things, the owners raised the
objection to applying the state’s rules on implied dedication to
shorelines, since those rules had largely been developed in the context of
140
The court noted that there might be some basis for
roads.
141
distinguishing the two contexts, but still rejected it: “Even if we were
reluctant to apply the rules of common-law dedication to open
recreational areas, we must observe the strong policy expressed in the
constitution and statutes of this state of encouraging public use of
142
shoreline recreational areas.”

137. Thornton, 462 P.2d at 676.
138. Borough of Neptune City v. Borough of Avon-by-the-Sea, 294 A.2d 47, 54–55 (1972) (citing
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 12:3–33, 34). The court has also recognized some (though not unlimited) power on
the part of the legislature to authorize the grant of private rights in land covered by the public trust,
notwithstanding the general common law notion that the state’s interest in such lands could not be
abdicated. Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass’n, 471 A.2d 355, 360–62, 362 n.5 (N.J. 1984).
The court also extended the doctrine to grant public access to the privately owned dry sand beach
where “use of dry sand is essential or reasonably necessary for enjoyment of the ocean.” Id. at 365.
Here, too, the court relied in part on the notion of common law changing to meet changing social
needs, but also on the “statewide policy of encouraging . . . greater access to ocean beaches for
recreational purposes”—a policy embodied in the state’s Statewide Comprehensive Outdoor
Recreation Plan. Id. at 364–65 (quoting Lusardi v. Curtis Point Prop. Owners Ass’n, 430 A.2d 881, 886
(1981)).
139. Gion v. City of Santa Cruz, 465 P.2d 50, 52 (Cal. 1970).
140. See id. at 58.
141. Id. (“This emphasis on roadways arises from the ease with which one can define a road, the
frequent need for roadways through private property, and perhaps also the relative frequency with
which express dedications of roadways are made.”).
142. Id.; see id. at 59 (citing the Constitution and a variety of “legislative enactments that indicate
the strong public policy in favor of according public access to the coast”). For another useful
discussion of state courts’ approach to public policy in determining public access to private property,
see Kate Shelby, Taking Public Interests in Private Property Seriously: How the Supreme Court ShortChanges Public Property Rights in Regulatory Takings Cases, 24 J. Land Use & Envtl. L. 45, 53–58
(2008).
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Granted, state judicial deference to legislatures is far from absolute.
State courts sometimes suggest, for example, that there are limits to state
legislatures’ power to regulate in areas covered by the public trust
143
doctrine. Citing constitutional grants of judicial power, they may resist
state legislative initiatives in areas long dominated by the common law,
144
as with tort reform. In addition, a state court may invite legislatures to
145
reconsider a judicial decision or revise existing statutes; it may even
“choose a particular solution in the hope of fostering legislative
146
action.”
Moreover, legislatures sometimes show deference to state courts. In
147
formulating statutes they often take the common law into account. For
example, in the Beach and Shore Preservation Act, the Florida
legislature was careful to make the general proclamation that “there is
no intention on the part of the state to extend its claims to lands not
already held by it or to deprive any upland or submerged land owner of
the legitimate and constitutional use and enjoyment of his or her
148
property.” It went on to say that if a project could not be accomplished
consistent with that aim, the state should use its eminent domain
149
power.
Still, while deference and influence can work both ways, there is no
doubt that judicial deference to legislative policy plays a particularly
important role. It helps answer the charge that state courts’ lawmaking
power (through change in the common law) is undemocratic, given that
courts are not accountable to the electorate.
b. Dueling Versions of Florida Property Law
The Florida Supreme Court’s handling of the property issues before
it fits quite comfortably with our description of state lawmaking,
including a degree of deference to the legislature. As noted earlier, the
court found that private beachfront owners’ rights to future accretion
150
was merely a “contingent right,” not a protectable property right. This
143. E.g., Neptune City, 294 A.2d at 51–55.
144. See, e.g., Adrian Vermeule, The Judicial Power in the State (and Federal) Courts, 2000 Sup.
Ct. Rev. 357 (2000).
145. Abrahamson & Hughes, supra note 127, at 1054–59; Kaye, supra note 126, at 603.
146. Abrahamson & Hughes, supra note 127, at 1056.
147. See Kaye, supra note 126, at 601.
148. Fl. Stat. § 161.141 (2012) (“Property rights of state and private upland owners in beach
restoration project areas.”).
149. Id. The solicitude for property rights is not surprising, coming from a legislature that enacted
a general statute that provides, as a matter of state law, for compensation in case of regulatory takings,
Bert J. Harris, Jr., Private Property Protection Act, Fla. Stat. § 70.001 (2010), and which received an
“A” from a prominent property rights group formed to promote state legislative restrictions on
eminent domain after the Kelo decision. See Marc Mihaly & Turner Smith, Kelo’s Trail: A Survey of
State and Federal Legislative and Judicial Activity Five Years Later, 38 Ecology L.Q. 703, 709 (2011).
150. Walton Cnty. v. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc., 998 So. 2d 1102, 1118 (Fla. 2008).
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right, the court said, “arises from a rule of convenience intended to
151
balance public and private interests.” In finding that the reasons for
recognizing the contingent right did not apply in the context of
restoration of critically eroded beaches, the court took careful note of the
152
balance the legislature had struck between public and private interests.
In particular, the court considered that restorations under the Florida
statute would remove “the upland owner’s . . . risk of losses and repairs
153
due to erosion” as well as the prospect of future accretions.
Similarly, the Florida Supreme Court found that there was no
property right to contact with the water; any such right was merely
ancillary to the right of access to the water. Here, too, the court
essentially deferred to the legislature’s determination that beachfront
property owners’ access to the ocean would be adequately protected in
154
the restoration projects. Throughout its opinion, the majority expressed
respect for the choices made by the legislature as it sought to balance its
responsibility under the Florida constitution to protect the beaches and
155
to respect private property. For the dissent, this deference simply
revealed “the majority’s desire to destroy protected private-property
156
rights” in an effort to uphold the statute.
Of course, the Florida Supreme Court did not focus solely on
legislative policy. Much of its discussion of the basic framework of
beachfront property rights consisted of a look at prior Florida cases. It is
clear, however, that even in so doing it was to some extent taking
legislative policy into account, given that in enacting the Florida Beach
Restoration statute the legislature expressly affirmed its intention to
respect the common law of property. The idea of a sharp distinction
between common law and statutory law makes no sense in this context.
A sharp distinction is, however, exactly what the Beach
Renourishment plurality drew in its analysis of Florida law. It treated the
relevant law as consisting entirely of judicial opinions in Florida. The
plurality began by noting the petitioners’ claims that their rights to
accretion and contact with the water had been eliminated. The plurality
responded that such claims could be upheld only if the petitioners could
meet the burden of showing that such rights were established—a showing

151. Id. at 1118.
152. Id. at 1118–19.
153. Id. at 1118.
154. Id. at 1119–20. The court’s deference was not total. It warned that if in the course of beach
restoration the state made the beach so wide as to “materially and substantially impair the upland
owner’s access,” that would amount to a taking. Id. at 1120 n.16.
155. See, e.g., Walton Cnty., 998 So. 2d at 1107 (condoning the legislature’s attentiveness to “the
importance and volatility of Florida’s beaches”); id. at 1115 (applauding the legislature’s attempt to
draft the Act to keep “a careful balance between the interests of the public and the interests of the
private upland owners”).
156. Id. at 1127 (Lewis, J., dissenting).
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that would have to be made in the face of what the plurality claimed was
157
deference to the Florida courts in case of doubt. In the course of a
detailed discussion of Florida law, the plurality made no mention
whatsoever of what the Florida Supreme Court had treated as
significant—the state constitutional mandate to protect the beaches and
the legislature’s view that beachfront property owners’ access to the ocean
would not be unduly interfered with by the renourishment projects. Its
sole focus was on Florida case law.
The version of Florida law the plurality analyzes is a desiccated one,
taking no account of statutes or the announced policy of the state’s
political branches. But writing state legislatures out of the picture has its
uses. Under the plurality’s new takings category, only judicial opinions
would count in determining whether an established right had been
158
eliminated.
In one sense, of course, the plurality’s approach would not
disempower state legislatures. The same interactive process of lawmaking
could continue. When the federal courts assessed the making of state
property law against the strictures of the Takings Clause, however, the
legislature’s input would count for nothing. Conceivably a case could be
159
made for such an outcome. But the case ought to be made, and its
tension with the Court’s federalism project acknowledged.
The utter neglect of any real consideration of federalism—
substantively and institutionally—is, sadly, not unprecedented. In Bush v.
160
Gore, the Court simply ignored the obvious issues of standing and
political question, notwithstanding its pious assertions in other contexts
of the need for careful attention to the modesty of the Court’s role. The
161
Court promised that Bush v. Gore would be unique. Apparently, the
plurality took that promise to be confined to the Court’s substantive
157. Despite the plurality’s claim to give deference to state courts in determining whether a right
was established, it essentially reviewed Florida judicial opinions de novo, developing its own
framework for analyzing the issues and reaching its conclusions essentially independently of the
Florida Supreme Court’s approach.
158. The hostility to the input of state legislatures is strongly reminiscent of Lucas. In that case, the
Court held that a complete deprivation of economic value constituted a taking, unless the regulation
could be justified under “background principles” of state law. Lucas v. S. Carolina Coastal Council,
505 U.S. 1003, 1006–31 (1992). The opinion, written by Justice Scalia, was clear that these background
principles were the sole province of the state courts. Id. Dissenting, Justice Stevens noted that the
majority’s unwillingness to allow legislative input into the “background principles” of state common
law that might justify a complete deprivation of value “den[ied] the legislature much of its traditional
power to revise the law governing the rights and uses of property.” Id. at 1068–69 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
159. Some commentators, for example, worry that state legislatures are too easily captured by
interests hostile to the protection of property rights. See, e.g., Dennis J. Coyle, Takings Jurisprudence
and the Political Cultures of American Politics, 42 Cath. U. L. Rev. 817, 853–54 (1993).
160. 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
161. Id. at 109 (“Our consideration is limited to the present circumstances, for the problem of
equal protection in election processes generally presents many complexities.”).
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holding regarding equal protection and not to the practice of blatantly
ignoring whole bodies of relevant case law.
C. Knowing Artlessness
Having established a test that ignores the Court’s federalism
holdings and substitutes a desiccated version of state property law for the
real thing, the plurality next undertook a close analysis of Florida law on
accretion and avulsion to see whether any established right had been
eliminated. The plurality’s analysis betrays a seemingly artless
conception of property rights, epitomized by its resort to a deus ex
machina—a Florida case never cited by the Florida Supreme Court that,
miraculously, resolves the entire question. This kind of exercise is
appropriate for a “Where’s Waldo” adventure, but takings law deserves
better.
1. The Plurality’s Conception of Property Rights
At the core of the plurality’s approach lies this view: Property
owners must sometimes suffer the effects of uncompensated changes of
regulations—regulatory takings law is no guarantee of stasis—but the
underlying definitions of what constitutes property will remain stable
over time (at least once they are established). This view is implicit in the
plurality’s position that any elimination of an established property right
162
would occasion a requirement of compensation.
This view, however, betrays a fundamental misunderstanding of
how property law typically works. There is no such thing in property law
as an “established property right” plain and simple. The “established”
quality of any property right is always provisional and relative. In turn,
that means that the judgment whether a right has been “eliminated” can
never be as straightforward as the plurality’s test implies. Any time a
federal court answers the question whether an established right was
eliminated, it will of necessity engage in an act of judgment—or rather, of
second-guessing states’ judgments—about how property should be
163
regulated.

162. Such a view accords with the most conservative conception of property law, which sees it as
essentially static and unchanging, with only a highly constrained potential for occasional change. See
Richard A. Epstein, The Static Conception of the Common Law, 9 J. Legal Stud. 253, 258 (1980)
(“The rules with respect to real property and its unauthorized entry are very old, and they are very
constant.”); id. at 265–69; Richard A. Epstein, Taking Stock of Takings: An Author’s Retrospective,
15 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 407, 413–14 (2006). Even in Lucas, which held that complete deprivation
of value could amount to a taking, the Court provided that the state regulation might be justified on
the basis of “background principles,” which as Justice Kennedy took pains to note, might change over
time. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1035 (Kennedy, J., concurring). In Beach Renourishment, the plurality set out
no comparable exception to its proposed rule that elimination of an established property right violates
the Takings Clause.
163. For other discussions, see Byrne, supra note 3, at 629 (“Placing property ‘rights’ at the center
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There are two reasons for this ambiguity. The first is that property
rights are relative to a purpose; in fact, defining property rights and
regulating them are essentially the same activity. The second is that
courts routinely expect rights holders to weigh property rights
differently, depending on the context.
a. Rights and Purposes
Property rights can be established in state law for one purpose but
not another. Consequently, rejecting the idea of a property interest in
something does not necessarily constitute taking away an established
right, even when a property interest in that same thing was recognized
earlier. This is especially so with regard to particular sticks in the
property bundle—the implicit focus of the plurality’s test.
Consider one typical sequence of state cases. In 1941 the Florida
Supreme Court stated in Dunahoo v. Bess that a widower had a
164
“property right” in his wife’s corpse. Did this mean that Florida
residents now had an established property right in their deceased
spouse’s corpse? If it did, then subsequent cases could be understood as
chipping away at the right, taking it away entirely, and then giving it
back.
In 1950, in Kirksey v. Jernigan, the Florida Supreme Court
“clarified” Dunahoo (as the court itself characterized its action years
later) as recognizing the “right to the possession of the body of a
deceased person for the purpose of burial, sepulture or other lawful
165
disposition.” Was this an “elimination” of an established right? A
clarification?
Then in 1986, in State v. Powell, the court rejected a claim that a
Florida statute committed a taking of property by permitting a medical
examiner to remove a decedent’s cornea for transplant without the
166
express permission of the kin. The “universally accepted” view, the
court said, was that “the next of kin has no property right but merely a
of regulatory takings analysis requires scholastic distinctions between sticks and bundles and invites
ideological manipulation behind a mystifying shield.”); Laura S. Underkuffler, Judicial Takings: A
Medley of Misconceptions, 61 Syracuse L. Rev. 203, 211 (2011) (“The idea of a judicial taking assumes
that a ‘previously established’ or vested right existed in law, and was destroyed by the court’s later
decision. However, courts do not ‘make’ the law, or fabricate it from whole cloth; they interpret the
common law, or interpret statutes, or interpret rules and regulations. We assume that courts are
competent, and are aware of what they do. If a prior interpretation of the law by a court was later
repudiated by that court, it is because the court believed that was wrong; and it is theoretically
impossible for a party to claim a protected right in a previously erroneous interpretation.”).
164. 200 So. 541, 542 (1941) (claim for damages from careless embalming of deceased wife’s body).
165. 45 So. 2d 188, 189 (1950) (claim for damages relating to undertaker’s having embalmed
plaintiff’s deceased child without authorization). See State v. Powell, 497 So. 2d 1188, 1191 (Fla. 1986)
(explaining that Kirksey “clarified” the right expressed in Dunahoo).
166. Powell, 497 So. 2d at 1192. The statute forbade removal of the corneas if the next of kin
objected, but required no notice to them of their right to object. Id. at 1189.

Doyle & Schnably_20 (S. Alessi) (Do Not Delete)

116

12/19/2012 3:02 PM

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 64:101
167

limited right to possess the body for burial purposes.” If Kirksey was a
“clarification,” the reference in Powell to the next of kin having “no”
property right might well sound like an elimination of a right.
168
In 2001, in Crocker v. Pleasant, the court again faced the issue and
ruled that parents did have a “protectable property interest” for
169
purposes of a § 1983 claim against a police department whose alleged
negligence caused their son’s body to be buried without their
170
knowledge. This time it clarified the broad “no property” language of
Powell, noting that Powell was decided in light of a shortage of
transplantable corneas. At least for the purposes of Fourteenth
Amendment protection, the next of kin had a “quasi-property interest”
171
in the body. Whether a “quasi-property” interest amounts to an
established right is an interesting question.
There is certainly nothing unusual about this sequence of a broad
statement subsequently clarified in both narrowing and expanding ways.
But the potential for a claim that a property right was “established” at
one point and later “eliminated” is obvious. Indeed, one impact the
adoption of a new Lingle category might have is that state courts might
think twice before narrowing earlier, rather broad declarations of
property rights (as happened in Kirksey and Powell), out of concern that
they would be held to have committed a taking. Or they might be
hesitant to broaden them (as arguably happened in Crocker) out of
concern that any subsequent narrowing of the right in other
circumstances would amount to a taking.
What accounts for this kind of sequence, which is hardly unusual?
At base, it reflects the fact that there is no real difference between
defining or delineating property rights, on the one hand, and regulating
them, on the other. It is easy to think of them as conceptually and
institutionally distinct: Property rights are what you have, whereas
regulations are things legislatures and agencies do to people who have
them. But rather than characterizing the sequence of cases from
Dunahoo to Crocker as potentially establishing and eliminating rights,
we could just as accurately describe what the Florida Supreme Court was
doing as regulating the relations among private parties with respect to a
corpse, as well as setting out the powers of the state vis-à-vis private
parties with respect to a corpse.

167. Id. at 1192.
168. 778 So. 2d 978 (Fla. 2001).
169. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006).
170. Crocker, 778 So. 2d at 984.
171. See id. at 985; see also id. at 988 (describing a property interest in body as a “legitimate claim
of entitlement”).
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b. Rights and Context
Courts routinely expect rights holders to evaluate how solid (or
172
vested) their rights are. Consider Kendall v. Ernest Pestana, Inc. The
California Supreme Court rejected the rule, in force then in most states,
that a clause in a lease requiring the landlord’s consent to assignment or
sublease gave the landlord power to reject a proposed transfer for any
reason. Instead, the court held, the landlord’s rejection of a proposed
transfer by the tenant must be commercially reasonable. In confronting
173
the claim that landlords had reasonably relied on the prior rule, the
court in effect had to ask whether the landlord’s right to absolute
discretion was an “established” one.
In answering “no,” the California Supreme Court made several
points. One was that while the question had been addressed by lower
courts, it had never decided the question itself. A right affirmed only by
lower courts is not the same as one blessed by the state’s highest court.
Another factor was that the trend in other states was toward the minority
174
rule requiring landlords to show commercial reasonableness.
There was nothing unusual about the approach the court took. But
if the California court were to apply the test put forth by the Beach
Renourishment plurality—whether a court has “eliminated” an
“established” right—there could only be confusion. Certainly landlords
would feel like they lost something after Kendall—the right to refuse a
proposed sublease without having to justify the decision to a court. But
perhaps the trend elsewhere showed that the landlord’s right was never
fully established in the first place. Or perhaps the trend in other states
eroded—partially eliminated—the established rule. If the latter, perhaps
California did not eliminate an established rule; other states did. Indeed,
one of the features of courts’ expectation that property rights holders will
pay attention to trends in other states is that rights may gradually recede
175
without any one particular state being responsible for that recession.
172. 709 P.2d 837 (Cal. 1985).
173. The argument was that landlords had been agreeing to lease provisions stating merely that
their consent was required, without adding that it could be withheld for any reason, because thenexisting law so provided. Id. at 840–41.
174. Id. at 841–42.
175. These points hardly exhaust the potential inadequacies of the plurality’s either/or approach to
establishment and elimination. For example, a right can be “established” without anyone knowing it.
One form of property scholarship is to identify from a range of cases the existence of a right that must
undergird their holdings, even if no court has previously recognized the right as such. The “reliance
interest in property” may be one such example. See Joseph William Singer, The Reliance Interest in
Property, 40 Stan. L. Rev. 611, 745 (1988). For other examples, see Joseph William Singer, The AntiApartheid Principle in American Property Law, 1 Ala. C.R. & C.L. L. Rev. 91, 92 (2011); Lior Jacob
Strahilevitz, The Right to Destroy, 114 Yale L.J. 781, 783–84, 787–91 (2005). The template of these
“rights discoveries” is the identification of a pattern of regulation (by statute or common law or both),
the express labeling of which as a right is thought to help analysis of other related questions about the
proper scope and content of the regulation. If a number of state courts, examining the pattern,
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The fluidity evident in Kendall is not just a matter of private law
rights. Courts may well define something as a property right for certain
private law purposes but not for takings purposes. Or they may define
them as rights for procedural due process purposes but not for takings
176
Similarly, something may be property for Fourth
purposes.
Amendment purposes but not takings purposes.
Alaska’s regulation of salmon fisheries provides a good example.
Commercial salmon fishers must have permits to harvest Pacific salmon
in Alaskan waters. Between 1996 and 2002, the state issued regulations
shortening the fishing season and imposing other restrictions that
177
reduced commercial salmon fishers’ harvest. Permit holders challenged
the regulation as a taking of their permits. The Alaska Supreme Court
ruled that the permits did not constitute property under state law and
178
rejected the takings challenges.
What is striking is that in the course of its opinion the court
acknowledged that it had previously held that the permits do constitute
179
“‘ordinary personal property’ for inheritance purposes,” and are
180
“subject to execution for past due child support claims.” It also took
note of its earlier holding that permit seekers have a property interest in
the permit for purposes of the notice and hearing requirements of the
181
due process clause. In rejecting the takings claim, the court made clear
that in no way did it intend to cast doubt on these earlier holdings. The
182
permits are not “property interests for the purposes of takings claims.”
These distinctions make good sense. A certain interest might be
important enough to merit procedural protections before its deprivation;
that interest could be recognized as property for purposes of the due

conclude that there is a right to destroy, for example, what are we to say of a state court that, upon
examining the same trend in its own law, declines to recognize a right to destroy? Whether we say the
right was never established in that state, or the right was eliminated by that court decision, amounts to
a matter of characterization, not substance.
176. See Hoffman v. City of Warwick, 909 F.2d 608, 620 n.11 (1st Cir. 1990) (“Our holding that
plaintiffs have not been deprived of a property interest for Takings Clause purposes is not
determinative of the issue whether they had a property interest for procedural due process
purposes.”).
177. Vanek v. Board of Fisheries, 193 P.3d 283, 285–87 (Alaska 2008).
178. It rested this conclusion in part on the fact that the statute providing for the permits
specifically stated that they constituted “a use privilege that may be modified or revoked by the
legislature without compensation,” id. at 288–89 (quoting Alaska Stat. § 16.43.150(e)), and in part on
the fact that the Alaska Constitution forbids the creation of an “exclusive right or special privilege of
fishery,” id. at 290 (quoting Alaska Const. art. VIII, § 15). In other words, consistent with our earlier
discussion, see supra Part I.B.2.a, the court relied heavily on legislative (and state constitutional)
sources in deciding whether there was a property right in the permits.
179. Vanek, 193 P.3d at 291 (quoting Wik v. Wik, 681 P.2d 336, 337 (Alaska 1984)).
180. Id. (quoting Anderson v. Anderson, 736 P.2d 320, 324 (Alaska 1987)).
181. Id. (citing Miner’s Estate v. Commercial Fisheries Entry Comm’n, 635 P.2d 827, 832 (Alaska
1981)).
182. Id. at 292.
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process clause. There is no obvious reason, however, why according
some degree of procedural protection before depriving someone of an
interest necessarily entails a requirement of compensation if that interest
is taken away or terminated after a hearing—or if any recognition of the
interest is withdrawn entirely as a matter of defining property rights.
Indeed, to hold otherwise might ultimately result in less protection.
Courts might hesitate to accord procedural due process safeguards to
particular interests lest the state now find that the state-imposed
withdrawal or termination of those interests required compensation.
While there is a great deal to be said for it, the idea of “property
rights for some state law purposes but not takings purposes” does not fit
within the Beach Renourishment plurality’s simple sequence of a takings
claim proven when a right is first “established” and then “eliminated.” If
a property interest was earlier recognized in the permit, why would the
Alaska court’s denial of any property interest under the Takings Clause
not itself constitute a taking under the proposed new category?
Of course, the fact that the plurality would bring an end to this kind
of nuanced view of property rights does not, in itself, show that the
plurality was wrong. Perhaps there is too much danger of manipulation.
In theory, a state court could evade the Takings Clause entirely by a
simple maneuver: holding all its state-created property interests to be
183
property for state law purposes but not takings purposes.
There is a well-established means of dealing with any state
manipulation of its property law to avoid a constitutional compensation
requirement. In general, a federal court’s deference to a state court’s
construction of state law is subject to a “fair and substantial basis” or
184
“fair support” test. The plurality was plainly not interested in a test
aimed at preventing state court evasion of federal law through
185
manipulation of state law. It seems preferable, however, to deal with
the possibility of evasion or manipulation by a test designed to counter

183. An unlikely maneuver of this sort would, however, likely fall afoul of the Court’s rejection of
the notion that a state could define all property rights as being subject to a condition that they may be
eliminated without compensation. Under Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001), the state
cannot even automatically hold property owners to the law in place at the time property was acquired.
See id. at 626 (“This Court rejects the . . . rule that a purchaser or a successive title holder . . .is deemed
to have notice of an earlier-enacted restriction and is barred from claiming that it effects a taking.”);
id. at 627 (“The State may not put so potent a Hobbesian stick into the Lockean bundle.”).
184. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592, 2608 (2010).
See, e.g., Wolfe v. North Carolina, 364 U.S. 177, 185 (1960) (“It is settled that a state court may not
avoid deciding federal questions and thus defeat the jurisdiction of this Court by putting forward
nonfederal grounds of decision which are without any fair or substantial support.”); Ward v. Love
County, 253 U.S. 17, 22–23 (1920) (holding that state court judgments based on independent state law
grounds are beyond Supreme Court review unless the state law grounds are “plainly untenable.”). For
a useful overview, see Laura S. Fitzgerald, Suspecting the States: Supreme Court Review of State-Law
Judgments, 101 Mich. L. Rev. 80 (2002).
185. Beach Renourishment, 130 S. Ct. at 2608.
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evasion. Eliminating the possibility of limited recognition of particular
property rights—recognition that does not extend to takings protection—
would make courts and legislatures hesitate unduly before granting any
protective status to interests.
In short, the fundamental importance of context to property rights
renders the plurality’s simplistic approach—“a right is established or
eliminated”—unworkable. Any attempt to implement the new category
proposed by the plurality will have to deal with this feature of property
law, one the plurality entirely overlooked. Property rights—especially
particular sticks in the bundle—are often not “established” in the on/off
sense in which the plurality conceived them. And even a right that did
appear more established in that sense when it comes to relations among
private parties might still not be established for purposes of the Takings
Clause.
2. Justice Scalia’s Guest Turn as a Florida Justice
The artlessness built into the plurality’s proposed test was most on
display in Justice Scalia’s would-be virtuoso performance as a state
judge, outdoing the Florida Supreme Court in the analysis of Florida case
law. The plurality was quick to cast aside the Florida Supreme Court’s
187
framework, implying that it had asked the wrong questions.
The divergence relates to the key question. Because the statute
governing the program provided that the boundary between public and
private would be permanently fixed at the mean high water line over the
last two decades or so, property owners would lose the possibility of
gaining land through future accretion, and they would also lose direct
contact with the water. Both points were undisputed.
To reach its conclusion that the loss of accretion and contact with
the water did not constitute a taking, the Florida Supreme Court focused
on the prior hurricanes as avulsive events. As it noted, Florida law had
long provided that, whereas slow and gradual changes (accretion and
erosion) move the boundary line, a sudden change wrought by a
hurricane does not; the property line is fixed at the mean high water line
188
before the hurricane. In a case where beach renourishment might be
undertaken, an avulsive event—a hurricane—would already have taken
place, fixing the boundary line. In turn, that would mean that the beach
restoration statute, which provided that the boundary line would be at

186. See E. Brantley Webb, How to Review State Court Determinations of State Law Antecedent to
Federal Rights, 120 Yale L.J. 1192, 1219–24 (2011).
187. See Beach Renourishment, 130 S. Ct. at 2601 n.5 (“We . . . need not resolve whether the right
of accretion is an easement, as petitioner claims, or as Florida claims, a contingent future interest.”).
188. Walton County v. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc., 998 So. 2d 1102, 1117 (“[I]f the
shoreline is lost due to an avulsive event, the public has the right to restore its shoreline up to th[e]
MHWL [mean high water line].”).
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the mean high water line over the last two decades, had merely
formalized a fixing of the property line that had already taken place
through the hurricanes. This alone would be sufficient to deny the claim
that the statute had taken anything that Florida law guaranteed the
property owners. This conclusion, the Florida Supreme Court found,
impinged on no rights; the alleged right of accretion was contingent, not
vested, and the alleged right of contact was incidental to other rights
(primarily access to the water) which the beach restoration did not affect.
The Beach Renourishment plurality analyzed the question in an
entirely different way. For the plurality, the question was whether there
was an “exception” to one of two core principles of Florida law, both
identified by the plurality. The core principles were the state’s right to
replenish the portion of the beach it owned, and its continued ownership
of formerly submerged land after it was newly exposed by avulsion, even
if the result was to interrupt “the littoral owner’s contact with the
189
water.” The question, according to the Court, was whether the state
could take advantage of the second principle if it was the cause of the
avulsion—or whether that circumstance was an exception to the state’s
right to replenish or fill its own property. By this reckoning, it became
crucial to find a prior case that showed definitively that there was no
190
such exception.
The plurality then proceeded to find that there was indeed such a
191
case—Martin v. Busch, decided in 1927—which neither the majority nor
the dissent in the Florida Supreme Court had cited. In effect, the plurality
determined that all seven members of the Florida Supreme Court had
somehow overlooked a key case. Martin, the plurality asserted, shows that
even when the state causes an avulsion, it owns the land thereby
created—even if beachfront owners’ contact with the water is
interrupted. The plurality’s loudly proclaimed “deference” to state courts
192
in determining whether a right was established is thus something of a
smokescreen. What truly stands out is the image of the U.S. Supreme
Court besting the Florida Supreme Court in appreciating the significance
of the crucial Florida case.
There is one problem with this dazzling performance: It ignores the
judgment of the Florida Supreme Court that Martin was entirely
unnecessary to the decision—a judgment that does not appear to have
rested in ignorance of the existence of the case. In Martin, the Florida
Supreme Court faced the question of who owned land that was exposed

189. Beach Renourishment, 130 S. Ct. at 2611.
190. Id. The plurality treated the two core principles as “background principles” under Lucas. See
id. at 2612 (citing Martin v. Busch, 112 So. 274 (Fla. 1927)). This strongly suggests that the plurality
sees it as the role of the Supreme Court to determine what those background principles are.
191. 112 So. 274 (Fla. 1927).
192. Beach Renourishment, 130 S. Ct. at 2608 n.9.
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when the state partially drained Lake Okeechobee: the state, which
owned the lake and lakebed, or the private property owners fronting it?
193
Martin held in favor of the state.
It is easy to see how tempting it might be to treat Martin as the case
that saved the Florida Supreme Court from being labeled the first
“judicial taker.” One can (as the plurality did) analogize the state’s
draining of the lake to the state’s dumping of sand along the shoreline.
Both can be seen as artificial avulsions—sudden changes in the shoreline
caused by state actions. Since Martin held that the newly exposed land
continued to belong to the state—as it had while it was underwater—the
holding must have rested on the principle that an artificial avulsion fixes
the property line just as natural one does. This may have been “odd” and
194
“counter-intuitive,” but it was Florida law, even if the Florida Supreme
Court had somehow failed to realize it.
There is, however, a major problem with this scenario: Martin itself
said nothing about avulsion, let alone artificial avulsion, nor did it discuss
the alleged right of contact. It did not even use the word. Rather, it
declined to apply the general principle of accretion to award title to the
landowners.
Nor is this just a question of labeling. Why not give title to the
landowners? Prying a definitive answer out of Martin is not easy, if it is
195
possible at all. At times the opinion reads as if the court’s conclusion
rests on the proposition that the particular deeds the property owners
held simply did not cover more than the land they initially held, whatever
196
the general principles of riparian law might be. There are also
indications that the court’s view rested in part on its understanding of the
197
title Florida received to the land in question under a federal statute.
Still, the court does end its opinion with a general discussion of some
198
principles of riparian law.
One explanation might relate to the potentially great value of land
uncovered through drainage of Lake Okeechobee. Perhaps the holding
assumes that if the state spends public money for (what was then seen as)
a beneficial public project—partially draining the lake—the state, not

193. 112 So. at 287–88.
194. It was the plurality’s treatment of the state as the cause of the avulsion that set up what the
plurality called the “counter-intuitive” and “odd” rules of Florida law. Beach Renourishment, 130 S.
Ct. at 2612. This oddness in effect pushed matters to the brink—but in the end, the plurality said,
deference to the Florida court’s interpretation of Florida law saved the day. Id. at 2612–13.
195. For a detailed account of the history of Martin and its treatment by the Florida courts, see
Sidney F. Ansbacher, What Did You Expect from Swamp Sales, A Happy Ending?, Const. L. Comm.
Newsletter (ABA), Sept. 2010, at 11–18 (concluding that Martin was no longer good law in Florida
by the time the Beach Renourishment dispute arose).
196. Martin, 112 So. at 285–86.
197. Id. at 278–79.
198. Id. at 286–87.
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private owners fronting the lake, ought to get the benefit of the newly
uncovered land. Moreover, in contrast to cases where change occurs
gradually (as with accretion or erosion), it can be hard to identify what is
causing it, and it is much simpler just to give the adjacent landowners the
benefit of the accretion (and also the risk of erosion). But when the state
drains a lake, it may be easier to point to the state as the cause of the
199
change in the shoreline.
In Board of Trustees of Internal Improvement Trust Fund v. Sand
200
Key Associates, Ltd., decided in 1987, the Florida Supreme Court faced
the question of what to make of Martin. There, the state claimed that
land that had accreted to beachfront property in fact belonged to the
state. The state acknowledged that in general, accretion works to the
benefit of the private property owners. But it said that Martin had
recognized an exception: When the high tide line changes because of the
state’s actions, the state, not the private owner, gets the benefit of the
accretion. Here, the state argued, the accretion that had expanded the
beach was the result of a number of state projects—not beach
reclamation projects, but the building of piers and docks, which can
cause sand to accrete. It is only fair, the state argued, that the public
201
should benefit from these state expenditures.
The Florida Supreme Court ruled otherwise, holding that the
private property owners owned the newly accreted beach. The opinion
reads at times as if accretion is an absolute right under Florida law, but it
did not quite so hold. The majority held that accretion from forces
beyond the private property owner’s control would move the property
line seaward; only accretion caused by the landowner’s own actions
202
would accrue to the state. Essentially, it read Martin as limited to its
facts, citing a brief concurrence to Martin’s holding. It certainly did not
read Martin as enunciating some general principle that artificial avulsions
fix the property line.
The Sand Key majority’s treatment of Martin evoked a strong
dissent, which, after a detailed discussion of the case, concluded that it

199. What actually lay behind the Martin court’s thinking is not clear. While much valuable Florida
real estate relies on state drainage projects to keep it dry and valuable, the particular parcels at issue in
Martin might not fit this pattern. After a detailed account of the history of those parcels, Sidney
Ansbacher argues that the land uncovered by the drainage project likely had little development
potential (and indeed that a 1926 hurricane had put the land back underwater at the time Martin was
decided). Ansbacher, supra note 195, at 16–18. He also argues that the terms on which Florida
acquired Everglades land from the federal government included provisions for extensive installations
of dikes and drains, which uniquely burdened the land (including the parcels at issue in Martin) once
in private hands. Id. at 12–16; see also id. at 19 (“Martin was based on such unique circumstances that
it should not apply to beachfront parcels . . . .”).
200. 512 So. 2d 934, 936 (Fla. 1987).
201. Id. at 937; id. at 947 (Ehrlich, J, dissenting).
202. Id. at 941.
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had decided a more general proposition: When the state is the cause of
the change in property lines, the state owns any newly accreted or
exposed land. While the dissent would have held for the state in Sand
Key, one thing it did not do is read Martin as setting a special precedent
for artificial avulsions. Indeed, the dissent did not consider what
happened in Martin—partial drainage of a lake—to be an avulsion,
asserting that lake drainage on that scale could only be considered
203
gradual.
In any event, the status of Martin under Florida law is far from clear.
On the one hand, the reading the state gave Martin in 1987 is entirely
plausible, and one could even read Sand Key as a kind of judicial taking
of an established right—the right, that is, of the public to land that the
204
expenditure of state funds creates. On the other, it is possible that
Martin was simply clarified by the Florida Supreme Court in Sand Key.
In light of the Florida Supreme Court’s previous engagement with
Martin in Sand Key, there seems little reason to think that the Florida
justices all somehow managed to overlook Martin. To do that they would
have had to engage in an amazingly shallow reading of Sand Key (which
they did cite). Martin was discussed (not just cited) in the Sand Key
majority opinion and discussed quite extensively in the dissent. It seems
much more plausible to suppose that members of the Florida Supreme
Court saw no need to rely on Martin, a rather obscure case whose
meaning and significance grew more obscure with Sand Key. Martin,
after all, is critical only if one follows the Beach Renourishment
plurality’s formulation of the issue: What is the effect of an artificial
avulsion (a lake draining or beach reclamation project) on the boundary
between public and private? As we have seen, though, this question is
not important in the way the Florida Supreme Court formulated the
issue. That court regarded hurricanes as the avulsive acts, and took an

203. Id. at 945–47 (Ehrlich, J., dissenting).
204. Of course, since this is a public right there is no sign that the plurality would find a
constitutional violation; only private rights seem to matter here. One feature of a judicial takings
doctrine is that the federal courts would scrutinize state courts if, in the course of defining property
rights, they allegedly tipped the balance too far in favor of the public at the expense of “established”
private rights. There would be no such scrutiny if they tipped the balance the other way. Nor would
there be any clear-cut political accountability in the latter case. Some might think that Sand Key,
which rejected the state’s claim to own a newly created beach that came about because of accretion
caused by the state’s construction of a jetty, wrongly deprived the public of the fruits of its
expenditures. See, e.g., Elizabeth Belsom, Case Comment, After Coastal Construction: Staking Out a
Claim for Private Ownership, 40 U. Fla. L. Rev. 457, 467 (1988) (“When the public discovers that
costly government improvements actually grant away state property, the court may reconsider its
holding.”); Richard A. Epstein, The Public Trust Doctrine, 7 Cato J. 411, 419 (1987) (“The problem of
disposing of public property . . . raises the mirror image of public use and just compensation questions
under the takings clause. . . .”). A legislative reversal of Sand Key, however, would be immediately met
with claims that the legislature had taken what Sand Key held to be private property. For an incisive
analysis of this problem, see Shelby, supra note 142.
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approach that treated state law as an amalgam of common law and
legislative policy, with deference but not utter obeisance toward the
latter.
What is clear is that Martin’s role as the case that saved the day for
Florida in the U.S. Supreme Court makes sense only from the plurality’s
seemingly artless assumption that case law is all that matters. The utter
convenience of this artlessness leads one to suspect that it is more than a
little knowing.

II. Two Explanations
A. Pique
What might account for such a rogue opinion? Some of the
explanation may lie in Justice Scalia’s pique over beaches. It is not sand
and sun that preoccupies him, though. It is how states determine public
access to them. Justice Scalia seems particularly vexed by states that make
this determination on a broad basis that encompasses all beaches, rather
than employ doctrines that require a parcel-by-parcel determination.
1. Beach and Shoreline Battles
Many takings cases over the years have concerned access to
beaches, demarcation of public and private rights at the shoreline, or the
205
206
effect of development on access. Lucas concerned restrictions on
207
development on barrier islands; Beach Renourishment, restoration of
beaches eroded by hurricanes; Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v.
208
a temporary moratorium on
Tahoe Regional Planning Agency,
residential development to study its impact on the Lake Tahoe Basin;
209
210
and Nollan and Stevens, public access to beaches.
Questions of beach access have been the subject of intense conflict
at the state level. Beach Renourishment itself arose from such a context.
For years fights have been raging between beachfront property owners,
who relish privacy and solitude, and the Destin city council, which favors
211
public access to the beaches for the local population and for tourism.

205. Cf. Christie, supra note 3, at 72 (“From Nollan to . . . Beach Renourishment, the Supreme
Court has chosen the nation’s increasingly scarce sandy beaches as the stage for defining the
constitutional limits of private property protection.”).
206. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
207. 130 S. Ct. 2592 (2011).
208. 535 U.S. 302 (2002).
209. Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987). See supra note 52.
210. On Stevens, see infra notes 223–230 and accompanying text.
211. See Jennifer A. Sullivan, Laying Out an “Unwelcome Mat” to Public Beach Access, 18 J. Land
Use 331 (2003); S. Brent Spain, Note, Florida Beach Access: Nothing but Wet Sand?, 15 J. Land Use &
Envtl. L. 167, 187–89 (1999); Louis Cooper, Whose Beach Is It? Private Property Rights Clash with
Public Interests on Destin Beaches, Florida Freedom Newspapers, TheDestinLog.com, Aug. 21, 2009;
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Different states have created different frameworks to resolve conflicts
between beachfront property owners, on the one hand, and cities and
would-be beachgoers, on the other. We will not survey all the legal
battles nationwide over access, but instead focus on two sets of issues
relating to the rights of beachfront property owners versus those of the
public.
One question is whether the public has any right of access to the dry
sand beach when the property fronting the beach is privately owned. In
some states, the answer is clearly yes. The New Jersey Supreme Court
has held that the public does have rights of access to the dry sand portion
212
of the beach, even if it is privately owned. In Oregon, Thornton gave a
213
similar answer (based on a different legal theory).
In other states the answer is no. Florida law, for example, provides
no general easement or other public right of access to the dry sand
214
portion of beaches. Michigan has a comparable limit. Property owners
fronting the Great Lakes might in some sense have ownership right up to
the water, but the Michigan Supreme Court ruled, as noted earlier, that
the public has access to the shore right up to the ordinary high water
215
mark. The rights do not extend beyond that, however.
In Texas, the answer is unclear. There may be rights of public access
to the dry sand beach, possibly even a “rolling easement” (that is, one
that changes with the movement over time of the mean high water
216
mark), but a ruling of the Texas Supreme Court in November 2010 cast
217
that notion into doubt.
A second question is whether the rights of the public must be
determined parcel-by-parcel, or whether they may be resolved on a more
blanket basis through a general doctrine. In both Florida and New
Jersey, the former is required. The dry sand portion of a private
Shannon Goessling, Destin Beachfront Property Rights Fight Isn’t Over, TheDestinLog.com, Oct. 5,
2011; see also Crystal Dunes Owners’ Ass’n v. City of Destin, No. 11-14595, 2012 WL 1293117 (N.D.
Fla. Apr. 17, 2012), aff’d, 2012 WL 1293117 (11th Cir. 2012), petition for cert. filed, U.S. No. 12-427
(Oct. 4, 2012); Fla. Att’y Gen., Regulation of Dry Sand Portion of Beach, AGO 2002–38 (May 24,
2002).
212. See Raleigh Ave. Beach Ass’n v. Atlantis Beach Club, Inc., 879 A.2d 112, 121 (N.J. 2005)
(“Today, recognizing the increasing demand for our State’s beaches and the dynamic nature of the
public trust doctrine, we find that the public must be given both access to and use of privately-owned
dry sand areas as reasonably necessary.”).
213. State ex rel. Thornton v. Hay, 462 P.2d 671, 678 (Or. 1969) (custom).
214. See Spain, supra note 211, at 169.
215. Glass v. Goeckel, 703 N.W.2d 58, 66–68 (Mich. 2005).
216. See Feinman v. State, 717 S.W.2d 106, 113 (Tex. App. 1986), writ ref’d n.r.e. (1987), reh’g on
writ of error overruled (1987); Matcha v. Mattox, 711 S.W.2d 95, 100 (Tex. App. 1986), writ ref’d n.r.e.
(1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1024 (1987); see also Gilbert L. Finnell, Jr., Public Access to Coastal
Public Property: Judicial Theories and the Taking Issue, 67 N.C. L. Rev. 627, 651–53 (1989).
217. Severance v. Patterson, 345 S.W.3d 18 (Tex. 2010). The court granted rehearing on the
opinion; subsequently the question of mootness was raised. Id. at 50. It was reinstated for rehearing in
October 2011. Severance v. Patterson, 2011 Tex. LEXIS 779 (No. 09-0387) (Oct. 7, 2011).
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beachfront lot is privately owned, but the doctrine of prescriptive
easements in favor of the public is recognized. To show such an easement
218
requires evidence relating to the public’s use of that particular lot.
Florida also recognizes the doctrine of customary rights of public access
to beaches, but it requires that custom be established on a parcel-by219
parcel basis. In New Jersey, while the public trust doctrine applies to
the entire dry sand beach, making public access relevant to all beachfront
parcels, the court’s approach requires some individualized showing that
220
public access is “reasonably necessary.” In both Oregon and Michigan,
in contrast, no case-by-case determination is needed. Texas law appeared
to recognize a non-case-by-case “rolling easement” for public access to
221
the dry sand beach, but that is in doubt.
2. Beach: Blanket or Case by Case?
It is this second question that has particularly engaged the energies
of property rights advocates. Indeed, the lengths to which Justice Scalia
would go to impose a requirement that any public access to privately
owned dry sand beaches be determined on a case-by-case basis is
impressive. Consider his dissent (joined by Justice O’Connor) from the
222
denial of certiorari in Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach in 1994.
Stevens arose out of the Oregon Supreme Court’s handling of the
public’s right of access to beaches in State of Oregon ex rel. Thornton v.
223
Hay, decided in 1969. As discussed earlier, in Thornton the Oregon
Supreme Court found a broad public right of access to the dry sand
portion of Oregon beaches, even though that portion was privately
224
owned. It rested this holding on the English doctrine of custom, and
further decided that the rights applied to all beaches in Oregon, without
the need for a case-by-case determination.
No petition for certiorari was filed in Thornton, so the Supreme
Court had no occasion at the time to rule on it. But in his dissent from
the denial of certiorari in Stevens a quarter century later, Justice Scalia
225
called Thornton a judicial “landgrab.” What particularly incensed him
was that in his view, the English doctrine of custom requires a factintensive, parcel-by-parcel determination of whether the public’s rights

218. See Spain, supra note 211, at 181–82.
219. City of Daytona Beach v. Tona-Rama, Inc., 294 So. 2d 73, 77–78 (Fla. 1974).
220. Raleigh Ave. Beach Ass’n v. Atlantis Beach Club, Inc., 879 A.2d 112, 121–24 (N.J. 2005)
(canvassing factors related to the history of the property and the public’s need for access). The Raleigh
test differs from that of an easement in part by its strong emphasis on public need. But it is still a caseby-case determination.
221. See supra note 217.
222. 510 U.S. 1207 (1994).
223. State ex rel. Thorton v. Hay, 462 P.2d 671 (Or. 1969).
224. See supra notes 129–137 and accompanying text.
225. Stevens, 510 U.S. at 1212 (Scalia, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
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226

have been established by custom. Yet, he said, “the Supreme Court of
Oregon determined the . . . existence of these fact-intensive criteria . . . in
227
a discussion that took less than one full page of the Pacific Reporter.”
He noted that the Oregon court’s approach “reinforce[s] a sense that the
228
court is creating the doctrine rather than describing it.”
The very language Justice Scalia used suggests pique at the
impertinence of a lower court that gave so little thought to what Justice
Scalia believes to be the proper interpretation of the common law of
custom. What reinforces this sense is the extraordinary lengths he would
have had the Court go to deal with Thornton.
In his dissent from the denial of certiorari in Stevens, Justice Scalia
did not assert that a judicial taking had occurred in the court below. The
229
Stevenses, owners of a lot next door to the motel at issue in Thornton,
had sought a permit to build a seawall on the dry sand beach. The permit
was denied on the ground that it would interfere with public access to the
full dry sand beach, and the Oregon courts upheld the denial based on
Thornton. Noting that the Stevenses had not been parties to Thornton,
Justice Scalia concluded that denying the permit on the authority of
Thornton—without giving them a chance to show that the public had not
customarily enjoyed access to their property—deprived them of their day
230
in court, and so constituted a due process violation.
Of course, if Thornton is correct as a matter of Oregon law, it is no
denial of anyone’s day in court to preclude a beachfront property owner
from litigating the public’s right of access to the dry sand beach. It is
simply a matter of stare decisis, applying a generally applicable ruling by

226. He also seemed to view the court’s ruling as an effort to make an end run around Lucas,
through cheap invocation of the “background principles” exception. See id. at 1207.
227. Id. at 1212.
228. Id. at 1212 n.4. Justice Scalia cast further doubt on Thornton by characterizing a later case,
McDonald v. Halvorson, 780 P.2d 714 (Or. 1989), as having significantly qualified Thornton by
adopting a tract-by-tract approach. Stevens, 510 U.S. at 1207. Some commentators have made a similar
assumption about Halvorson. See, e.g., Steven W. Bender, Castles in the Sand: Balancing Public
Custom and Private Ownership Interests on Oregon’s Beaches, 77 Or. L. Rev. 913, 943–44 (1998);
Amnon Lehavi, Property Rights and Local Public Goods: Toward a Better Future for Urban
Communities, 36 Urb. Law. 1, 25 n.75 (2004); Erin Pitts, The Public Trust Doctrine: A Tool for
Ensuring Continued Public Use of Oregon Beaches, 22 Envtl L. 731, 738 (1992). This seems a rather
strained reading of the case, which simply held that a cove near the beach, occasionally connected to
the ocean, was not part of the beach and so not covered by the custom found by Thornton to apply to
beachfront property. See Michael C. Blumm & Erika Doot, Oregon’s Public Trust Doctrine: Public
Rights in Waters, Wildlife, and Beaches, 42 Envtl L. 375, 377 n.7, 410 n.241 (2012) (arguing that Justice
Scalia read Halvorson incorrectly); see also Jo Anne C. Long, Note, McDonald v. Halvorson: Oregon’s
Beach Access Law Revisited, 20 Envtl. L. 1001, 1031 n.133 (1990) (effect of Halvorson on Thornton
uncertain). In any case, it was not crucial to Justice Scalia’s point, except perhaps to head off any
thought that the Oregon court’s holding a quarter century earlier had somehow become “established.”
That makes his willingness to wade into a contestable matter of state law all the more striking.
229. See Richard H. Chused, Cases, Materials and Problems in Property 144 (3d ed. 2010).
230. Stevens, 510 U.S. at 1212–13.
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the state’s highest court to a particular parcel. But if Thornton is
incorrect, and no public rights of access to any given parcel can be found
under Oregon law without a case-by-case determination, then the
Oregon courts’ refusal to let the Stevenses present evidence concerning
public access to their own parcel would be a patent injustice.
In short, Justice Scalia’s dissent asked the full Court to determine
whether a quarter century earlier Thornton had misconstrued Oregon
law and then, if it had, to hold that petitioners had been denied the factspecific hearing to which the proper construction of Oregon law entitled
them. From then on, any simple invocation of Thornton in state court
would trigger a due process violation, vitiating its precedential status.
Any state court holding on state property law could be retroactively
demolished this way—no matter how long ago decided.
Given both Stevens and the general ire that broad custom-based
rulings seem to provoke in property rights advocates, one prediction we
make is that if judicial takings doctrine ever does command a majority on
the Court, the single most likely outcome would be the national
imposition of a case-by-case determination of access to privately owned
dry sand beaches, precluding the use of general doctrines like custom or
the public trust to find such access on a state-wide basis.
But wait, as the infomercials tell us—there’s more.
B. Usurpation
It is by no means clear that other Justices share these views on
beach access. Nor, obviously, can we be absolutely certain of Justice
Scalia’s. Thus there remains the question of how a judicial takings
doctrine drew the votes of four Justices (with two others willing to
subject state courts’ definition of property law to new constitutional
scrutiny). One clue lies in the very issue—federalism—of which the
plurality was seemingly so oblivious.
Historically, increased federal judicial protection of states through
federalism doctrines has tended to go hand in hand with tighter Supreme
Court control over state law that is seen as posing a danger to property
and contract rights. This association might seem surprising: Federalism
doctrine would seem to be about opening up or at least preserving space
for states to act, while stricter judicial scrutiny of property and contract
matters would constrain states. But the Court, like Whitman, contains
231
multitudes. The association is real.

231. Walt Whitman, Song of Myself (1860), reprinted in Walt Whitman, Complete Poetry and
Collected Prose 246 (1982):
Do I contradict myself?
Very well then I contradict myself,
(I am large, I contain multitudes.)
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In the Lochner era, the Court was assertive about striking down
federal labor and other regulations on the ground that the Constitution
232
deemed them local matters. Yet when states attempted to regulate
wages and hours, the Court a number of times struck those efforts down
233
as beyond states’ power. Takings doctrine was one aspect of this
constraint on states. It was in the midst of the Lochner era that the Court
234
first articulated the regulatory takings doctrine.
The late eighties through the early nineties saw this same double
conservative revolution. One part was the “[r]eturn of the Takings
235
Clause” —a revival of increased scrutiny of state and local property
regulations. Nollan and Dolan put restraints on local officials’ ability to
236
First English Evangelical raised the
condition land use permits;
prospect that landowners who successfully challenged land-use
regulations would have to be compensated for any restrictions on the use
237
of their property in the interim. And Lucas created a new category of
238
taking for complete deprivation of value. At virtually the same time,
the Court upended six decades of deference to Congress and undertook
a newly heightened scrutiny of federal laws under the Commerce
239
It also breathed new life into the Tenth Amendment,
Clause.
fashioning an “anti-commandeering” principle protecting state and local
officials and legislatures from the burdens of implementing federal
240
legislation.
Neither part of this recent conservative revolution has quite fulfilled
241
its initial promise. Raich and Comstock both upheld federal authority.
Star of the revived Takings Clause, Lucas included an exception allowing
even a complete deprivation of value to stand if justified by background
242
principles of state nuisance and property law, an exception that

232. See, e.g., Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
233. See, e.g., Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915); Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908);
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
234. See supra notes 38–40 and accompanying text (discussing Pennsylvania Coal).
235. Coyle, supra note 159, at 818.
236. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994); Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825
(1987). See supra note 52.
237. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Los Angeles Cnty., 482 U.S. 304 (1987).
238. Lucas v. S. Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
239. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
See supra notes 103–109 and accompanying text.
240. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
For an incisive analysis of the relationship between the Court’s takings jurisprudence and federalism
trends in environmental regulation as of two decades ago, see Linda A. Malone, The Coastal Zone
Management Act and the Takings Clause in the 1990’s: Making the Case for Federal Land Use to
Preserve Coastal Areas, 62 U. Colo. L. Rev. 711, 746–73 (1991).
241. United States. v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949, 1965 (2010); Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 2
(2005).
242. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1031–32.
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threatens to turn into a black hole from which no takings claim escapes.
Both Kelo and Beach Renourishment represent the promise and (so far)
limits of this conservative revolution: In both cases the Court came
within one vote of a major conservative ruling on property rights
protections, largely ignoring federalism issues.
Thus the desire to cut Congress down to size through judicial
enforcement of federalism in Commerce Clause cases is not grounded in
strong confidence in state and local government. On the contrary,
conservative property rights activists manifest an almost paranoid fear
that state courts will be drawn into or even actively collaborate with state
legislative efforts to undermine property rights. Beach Renourishment is
best understood as an attempt to enlist the Court in the conservative
property rights movement’s campaign to limit democratic control over
244
natural resources.
This understanding may help to explain the plurality’s approach to
state common law, which, as noted earlier, erases the role of legislatures.
For conservatives, the kind of state legislative-judicial interaction we
have described—particularly when marked by judicial deference toward
245
the legislature—is a source of deep suspicion. The concern is that a
court may attempt to do for free what the legislature would have to
undertake with compensation to property owners if it made the change
itself.
In his influential article on judicial takings, for example, Barton
Thompson argues that the doctrine is needed to head off the possibility
of something like collusion between the legislature and the judiciary (or
at least informal direction of the latter by the former). Rather than
formally use eminent domain to take away rights of beachfront property
owners, a state legislature might announce a new policy (for example, the
importance of public access to beaches), and the state courts would

243. See Hope M. Babcock, Has the U.S. Supreme Court Finally Drained the Swamp of Takings
Jurisprudence?: The Impact of Lucas v. S. Carolina Coastal Council on Wetlands and Coastal Barrier
Beaches, 19 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 1 (1995); Michael C. Blumm & Lucus Ritchie, Lucas’s Unlikely
Legacy: The Rise of Background Principles as Categorical Takings Defenses, 29 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev.
321 (2005).
244. Cf. Laura S. Underkuffler, Tahoe’s Requiem: The Death of the Scalian View of Property and
Justice, 21 Const. Comment. 727, 749 (2004) (“[U]nder the Scalian view, consideration of asserted
public interests in the broad run of takings cases is not simply ignored—it is, in fact, illegitimate.”).
245. See supra Part I.B.2. To some extent this erasure might stem from Justice Scalia’s intellectual
outlook. In Beach Renourishment, Justice Scalia presented the common law as originally timeless and
unchanging, though of course subject to modification by statute. As he put it, “the Constitution was
adopted in an era when courts had no power to ‘change’ the common law.” Stop the Beach
Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t. Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592, 2606 (2011). That power, in his view,
was engrafted onto the common law in the nineteenth century. Id. at 2606–07. He thus presented state
courts’ power to change the common law almost as an alien hybrid which persists today, but which
must be regarded with great caution, especially when it comes to property rights. Id. For an insightful
analysis, see Mulvaney, supra note 3.
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follow up by issuing rulings that defined away any existing private rights
246
that stood in the way of public access. Other commentators have raised
247
similar possibilities. And the theme of judicial perfidy inspired by or

246. See Thompson, Judicial Takings, supra note 4, at 1487:
[J]udicial decisions in a number of states appear to be influenced on occasion by legislative
pressure and direction. Legislatures often send clear public messages, by legislation,
resolution, or other means, concerning the direction the state courts should take. Unless
legislatures are sending the messages purely as a show for the voters, the legislatures
presumably believe that such messages have an impact. Indeed, the desired results are
frequently obtained. In a number of recent cases raising claims of judicial takings, for
example, the state court announced its apparent shift in law only after the legislature passed
or proposed legislation clearly point out the direction it wished the court to take;
see also Karen A. Negris, Access to New Jersey Beaches: The Public Trust Doctrine, 20 Colum. J.L. &
Soc. Probs. 437, 458 n.146 (1986) (suggesting that the New Jersey Supreme Court’s reference to
legislative policy in deciding public trust doctrine case reflected a judicial effort “on behalf of the
legislature” to evade the strictures of the Takings Clause); Thompson, Judicial Takings, supra note 4,
at 1451 (“Courts have the doctrinal tools to undertake many of the actions that legislatures and
executive agencies are constitutionally barred from pursuing under the takings protections—and
pressure is mounting for courts to use those tools.”). Other commentators, while not necessarily seeing
wrongful collusion, view anything other than reining in the legislature as an improper role for the
courts when it comes to property rights. See James L. Huffman, Avoiding the Takings Clause Through
the Myth of Public Rights: The Public Trust and Reserved Rights Doctrines at Work, 3 J. Land Use &
Envtl. L. 171, 210 (1987) (“The legislature needs no assistance from the courts . . . . [Their] task . . . is
to protect individuals from the efforts of the legislature . . . .”).
247. One commentator raised this scenario after Lucas:
Suppose that the next time South Carolina wishes to restrict the use of property like
Lucas’s, instead of passing a new statute or issuing a new administrative regulation to
accomplish the restriction directly, the legislature simply authorizes private law suits to be
brought by the Coastal Council, or even private conservation groups, for the benefit of the
public, to enjoin what the Council believes to be harmful or noxious uses of property under
the state’s background principles of property law. The state court, then, is free to take this
winking and nudging from the legislature and effectively fashion new common law rules that
restrict the owner’s use of his property, denying compensation based on the claim that the
new rule is merely a background principle of the state’s law—that there was no property
right there to begin with.
Sarratt, supra note 4, at 1492; see also id. at 1493 (worrying about “the Lucas loophole”).
Another expressed similar skepticism about a Texas lower court’s upholding of a Texas statute,
the Texas Open Beaches Act, against takings challenges, arguing that the court was motivated in part
by a “desire to protect the government from claims of legislatively enacted takings of property
interests.” David J. Bederman, The Curious Resurrection of Custom: Beach Access and Judicial
Takings, 96 Colum. L. Rev. 1375, 1413–17 (1996) (arguing that, in the Texas Open Beaches Act, the
legislature modified the common law doctrine of customary access to beaches by providing that it
protected the public at large (all Texans), not just local residents, but that the Texas Court of Appeals
wrongly presented the legislation as simply codifying the customary law). Bederman’s position is that
the doctrine of custom in common law had largely been rejected by the turn of the twentieth century
because it created so much uncertainty as to property rights that it inhibited development, id. at 1398–
407, and that upon its revival in Texas it protected only residents living near that beach, not all Texans
(otherwise it would be “too indefinite”). See id. at 1415–16. Similarly, the Thornton case, discussed
earlier, becomes one in which “judicial activists recognize[d] custom-based property rights as an easy,
and cheap, means of vesting a public interest in a valuable resource.” Id. at 1380, 1417–26; see also id.
at 1449 (calling Thornton and similar cases “sua sponte assertions of public interests in private
property” and asserting that the only proper way to handle beach access questions is by “jury verdicts
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working in tandem with legislative greed was prevalent in many of the
248
briefs filed with the Court in Beach Renourishment.
This fear of state legislatures (and state legislative-judicial collusion)
seems to have led the Beach Renourishment plurality to erase Congress’s
role as well. Lurking within the plurality’s approach to the states is a
notably robust view of the Court’s role in the separation of powers. That
the separation of powers and federalism can intersect is no surprise.
Writing for the Court in Printz, Justice Scalia concluded that a federal
statute requiring state officials to implement a federal gun control law
249
trespassed on state sovereignty under the Tenth Amendment. He went
on to argue that placing enforcement of a federal statute in the hands of
state officials, whom the President does not control, infringes on the
250
President’s executive powers under Article II. Of course, federalism is
complex: It may have complemented protection of executive power in
Printz, but fifteen years later Justice Scalia invoked it in support of
letting the states undercut President Obama’s policy on enforcement of
251
federal immigration laws (a policy the Justice pronounced “unwise”).
The intersection of federalism and separation of powers plays out in
another way. The concern for each may be selective. Consider the
252
Court’s attitude to the Coastal Zone Management Act (“CZMA”).
The most comprehensive Congressional expression of federal policy
regarding coastal zone management, the CZMA was enacted in 1972 as
part of President Nixon’s “New Federalism” model of cooperative
253
federalism.
endorsing proofs of a localized custom”).
248. See, e.g., Petitioner’s Reply to Briefs in Opposition, Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v.
Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592 (2010) (No. 08-1151), 2009 WL 1370160, at *3 (The Florida
court acted “to allow the state to continue sponsoring beach renourishment projects”); id. at *12 (“The
Florida Supreme Court’s opinion is a product of judicial engineering to achieve a desired policy
result.”); id. at *13 (“The . . . ruling . . . is repulsive . . . .”); Brief Amicus Curiae of Cato Inst. et al. in
Support of Petitioner, Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592
(2010) (No. 08-1151), 2009 WL 2588282, at *6 (“The federal courts’ reluctance to apply the judicial
takings doctrine sends a message to state legislatures to forego legislative changes in the definition of
property rights, in favor of encouraging state courts to effect the same policy without exposing the
state to liability for just compensation.”).
249. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997).
250. Id. at 923 (“[The] unity [of the executive branch] would be shattered, and the power of the
President would be subject to reduction, if Congress could act as effectively without the President as
with him, by simply requiring state officers to execute its laws.”). See U.S. Const. art. II, § 3 (“[The
President] shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed . . . .”).
251. Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2521 (2012) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (criticizing the president’s policy as a failure to enforce the law, and arguing that in
light of state sovereignty under the Constitution, Arizona’s immigration enforcement law should not
be preempted).
252. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451–65 (2006).
253. See Andrew S. Jessen, Comment, Louisiana and the Coastal Zone Management Act in the
Wake of Hurricane Katrina: A Renewed Advocacy for a More Aggressive Use of the Consistency
Provision to Protect and Restore Coastal Wetlands, 12 Ocean & Coastal L.J. 133, 134–35 (2006);
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While state and local land use policy has a significant overlay of
federal regulation, particularly environmental regulation, the CZMA
makes clear that one area that the federal government leaves largely to
the states alone is rights of access to beaches. The CZMA declares a
national policy to provide for “public access to the coasts for recreation
254
purposes” —by “encourag[ing] and assist[ing] the states to exercise
effectively their responsibilities in the coastal zone through the
development and implementation of management programs to achieve
255
wise use of the land and water resources of the coastal zone.” In 1990,
Congress amended the CZMA to encourage states to take the public
256
trust doctrine into account in their coastal zone management planning.
Significantly, the CZMA was enacted after the failure of a proposed
National Open Beaches Act to gain passage in Congress. The various
versions of the proposed act would have declared access to beaches a
national interest and provided for federal action to protect or create
257
beach access.
The CZMA seeks to achieve its purpose by providing states with
funds to develop these programs. For example, states are expected to
develop plans to protect public access to beaches; as part of that
planning, each state defines, within some broad guidelines, what the
258
beach (public and private) is. Granted, the CZMA provides for some
conditions on federal funding and oversight of state programs developed
with it. What has resulted is what two commentators call a “[c]ooperative
259
federalism” with states as “dominant partners,” and another calls a
260
“capitulation of federal authority.” States that develop programs, for
Laurina M. Spolidoro, Area Contingency Plans: Is the Coastal Zone Management Act on a Collision
Course with Unfettered Oil Spill Response?, 27 Wm. & Mary Envtl. L. & Pol’y Rev. 755, 759–60
(2003). But see Sam Kalen, The Coastal Zone Management Act of Today: Does Sustainability Have a
Chance?, 15 Southeastern Envtl. L.J. 191, 204 (2006) (noting efforts of the Nixon administration to
undermine CZMA after its passage).
254. 16 U.S.C. § 1452(2)(E).
255. Id. § 1452(2).
256. See, e.g., Kalen, supra note 253, at 219.
257. See Marc R. Poirier, Environmental Justice and the Beach Access Movements of the 1970s in
Connecticut and New Jersey: Stories of Property and Civil Rights, 28 Conn. L. Rev. 719, 748–49 (1996);
Robert Thompson, Affordable Twenty-Four Hour Coastal Access: Can We Save a Working Stiff’s Place
in Paradise?, 12 Ocean & Coastal L.J. 91, 104–06 (2006). For a statement by the CZMA’s main
sponsor, see Robert C. Eckhardt, A Rational National Policy on Public Use of the Beaches,
24 Syracuse L. Rev. 967 (1973). In 1974, Congress also rejected a proposed National Land Use Policy
Act, which would have significantly federalized land use planning. See Poirier, supra, at 750–51; see
also Ludwik A. Teclaff & Eileen Teclaff, Saving the Land-Water Edge from Recreation, for Recreation,
14 Ariz. L. Rev. 39, 59–60 (1972).
258. See 16 U.S.C. § 1455(d); Coastal Zone Management Program Regulations, 15 C.F.R.
§§ 923.24(a), 923.31(5) (2012); see also S. Rep. No. 94-277, at 32–33 (1976).
259. George Cameron Coggins & Robert L. Glicksman, Public Natural Resources Law § 5:6
(2d ed. 2012).
260. Bruce Kuhse, The Federal Consistency Requirements of the Coastal Zone Management Act of
1972: It’s Time to Repeal This Fundamentally Flawed Legislation, 6 Ocean & Coastal L.J. 77, 108
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example, are assured that federal activities will be typically consistent
261
with those programs.
In enacting the CZMA, then, Congress displayed notable deference
262
to the states. To be sure, its decisions about when to defer to states may
not always look the most rational to everyone. Coastal zone areas are
clearly ones of national, not merely local, importance, and Congress’s
authority to act is unquestioned. As two commentators put it, “[u]nder
the United States Constitution, the federal government’s authority over
263
coastal and marine resources is clearly paramount.” We see no
constitutional reason why Congress could not enact a statute
guaranteeing, and regulating the terms of, public access to beaches
(though one suspects that such a statute would evoke cries of
264
“socialism”). Yet under the CZMA’s consistency requirement, the
usual relationship—federal supremacy over state law—is inverted, with
state law governing federal agency activity in matters covered by the
265
plan. Some commentators have argued that Congress has tipped the
266
balance too far in favor of state interests in coastal zones. Indeed, as
global warming threatens the coastlines, the need for federal intervention
267
may grow stronger.

(2001). For a response, see John A. Duff, The Coastal Zone Management Act: Reverse Pre-emption or
Contractual Federalism?, 6 Ocean & Coastal L.J. 109 (2001) (rejecting a “reverse pre-emption”
critique of the CZMA); see also Nat’l Oceanic & Atmospheric Admin. & Coastal States Org.,
Envisioning Our Coastal Future 7, 11 (2007), available at http://coastalmanagement.noaa.gov/czm/
czma_vision.html (describing the federal consistency requirement as a “states’ rights” measure).
261. See, e.g., Edward M. Cheston, An Overview and Analysis of the Consistency Requirement
Under the Coastal Zone Management Act, 10 U. Balt. J. Envtl L. 135 (2003); Jessen, supra note 253,
at 138–40; Kalen, supra note 253, at 201–03.
262. Indeed, it displayed rather more deference than did the Court in Lucas in invalidating a
regulation issued by the South Carolina Coastal Council, which the state had established in response
to the CZMA. See Regina McMahon, The Lucas Dissenters Saw Katrina Coming: Why Environmental
Regulation of Coastal Development Should Not Be Characterized as a “Taking”, 15 Penn St. Envtl. L.
Rev. 373, 387 (2007); see also Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
263. Thomas J. Schoenbaum & Frank Parker, Jr., Federalism in the Coastal Zone: Three Models of
State Jurisdiction and Control, 57 N.C. L. Rev. 231, 232 (1979).
264. We refer here to Congress’s power over the coastal areas, including its Commerce Clause
power. Of course, as with any other federal statute, it would need to comply with the requirements of
the Bill of Rights, including the Takings Clause. We simply disclaim any assertion that the
Constitution makes beach access an exclusively state matter.
265. On the consistency requirement, see Patrick J. Gibbons, Too Much of a Good Thing? Federal
Supremacy & the Devolution of Regulatory Power: The Case of Coastal Zone Management Act,
48 Naval L. Rev. 84 (2001); Kalen, supra note 253.
266. See Gibbons, supra note 265, at 86 (“This article argues that in pursuing an arrangement that
purports to restore traditional federal-state distributions of power, the Coastal Zone Management Act
inadvertently goes too far and gives the states excessive power.”).
267. Moreover, the CZMA has not been particularly effective in increasing public access to
beaches. See James M. Kehoe, The Next Wave in Public Beach Access: Removal of States as Trustees of
Public Trust Properties, 63 Fordham L. Rev. 1913, 1946–51 (1995).
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On the other hand, Congress approved the Religious Land Use and
268
Institutionalized Persons Act in 2000. That Act intrudes deeply into
state and local land use law. State and local zoning decisions or plans that
frustrate land use by religious institutions can be challenged in federal
269
court under heightened review. With a politics that regularly requires
presidential candidates to make public avowals of faith, it is not clear
why threats to religious freedom should be regarded as so great as to
necessitate such a deep intrusion into state land use planning.
What matters, though, is that these are choices that Congress has
made. Congress does, after all, have the power to authorize state
jurisdiction over issues that fall within the power of the federal
270
government to regulate. Granted, the CZMA does not rise to the level
of such an express authorization. But our point is different. Congress has
largely left the matter of beach access to the states. On what basis, then,
might the Court justify expanding the scope of the Takings Clause to
federalize beach access issues? “Judicial arrogance” is not a pretty
answer, but it is a hard one to dismiss.
The unilateral extension of federal judicial authority certainly
cannot be grounded on some consistent preference for federal authority.
At times (when convenient?) the Court has loudly proclaimed its great
reluctance, in interpreting federal statutes, to impute to Congress any
271
intent to impinge on traditional state authority. In Rapanos v. United
272
States, for example, Justice Scalia—writing for the same plurality as in
Beach Renourishment—expressed concern over the expansion of federal
environmental regulation, displacing “the States’ traditional and primary
273
power over land and water use.” According to Justice Scalia, the

268. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1–cc-5 (2006).
269. To be sure, there is little evidence in the legislative history that Congress actively thought
about federalism issues when it approved the Act. See Marci A. Hamilton, Federalism and the Public
Good: The True Story Behind the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 78 Ind. L.J.
311, 341–45 (2003). But inattention to state and local interests in some contexts, in light of great
solicitude for them in others, speaks volumes.
270. For example, Congress has the power to authorize any state or local law found to violate the
dormant commerce clause. See, e.g., C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 410 (1994)
(O’Connor, J., concurring).
271. E.g., United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 350 (1971) (narrowly construing a federal firearms
statute to avoid potential Commerce Clause problems).
272. 547 U.S. 715 (2006).
273. See id. at 737–38:
Even if the phrase “the waters of the United States” were ambiguous as applied to
intermittent flows, our own canons of construction would establish that the Corps’
interpretation of the statute is impermissible. . . . [T]he Government’s expansive
interpretation would “result in a significant impingement of the States’ traditional and
primary power over land and water use” [(quoting Solid Waste Agency v. U.S. Army Corps
of Engineers, 532 U.S. 159, 174 (2001))]. Regulation of land use, as through the issuance of
the development permits sought by petitioners in both of these cases, is a quintessential
state and local power. . . . We ordinarily expect a “clear and manifest” statement from
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federal statute at issue there did not encompass the wetlands the Corps
274
of Engineers sought to protect. While asserting that his sole aim was to
respect the language of the federal statute, he did not hide his contempt
for the federal agency, accusing the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers of
275
acting like an “enlightened despot.” Restraint is for the political
branches, judicially enforced if need be, but—in the hands of the Beach
276
Renourishment plurality—irrelevant to the Court’s own predilections.
The judicial federalism project on which the Court has embarked
since Lopez in 1995 rests on an assumption of what Justice O’Connor
277
called Congress’s “underdeveloped capacity for self-restraint.” For the
members of the Court to enshrine a judicial takings doctrine in an area
that the federal political branches have largely left to the states strongly
suggests that that assumption would be better directed to the Court itself.
It is not just states whom the Court cuts down to size with its takings
jurisprudence; it is Congress as well. This combination should be called
what it is: usurpation.

Conclusion: One Vote (Away)
Rather than hurl the charge of “rogue” at the plurality, why not
accuse it of promoting conservative judicial activism? Speaking of Bush
v. Gore a decade ago, Cass Sunstein focused on its sole virtue: “[I]t
should finally be possible for the American public to disregard the
278
ludicrous Republican rhetoric about ‘liberal judicial activism’ . . . .”
“We are now,” he went on, “in the midst of an extraordinary period of
right-wing judicial activism . . . . [in which] the Court seems oblivious to
the extent to which its own political preferences are playing a role” in its
279
decisions.
Would that it were so. “Judicial activism” would be preferable to an
opinion for which the pique of a right-wing Justice is as good an
explanation as principled politics. We do not doubt that Justice Scalia

Congress to authorize an unprecedented intrusion into traditional state authority.
274. Id. at 753.
275. Id. at 719.
276. Thus Chief Justice Roberts, joined by Justices Scalia and Alito, would have the Court secondguess local government decisions about how to handle tax refunds, relying on the minimum rationality
standard of Equal Protection doctrine. See Armour v. City of Indianapolis, 132 S. Ct. 2073, 2084 (2012)
(Roberts, C.J., dissenting). With its echoes of the admonition in Bush v. Gore that the Court’s equal
protection holding was for that case only, see Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 109 (2000), the Chief Justice’s
assurance that such intrusive federal review of local government decisions would be undertaken only
“every generation or so,” is anything but reassuring. Armour, 132 S. Ct. at 2087.
277. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 588 (1985) (O’Connor, J.,
dissenting).
278. Cass R. Sunstein, Does the Constitution Enact the Republican Party Platform? Beyond Bush v.
Gore, in BUSH V. GORE: The Question of Legitimacy 176, 177 (Bruce Ackerman ed. 2002).
279. Id. at 178.
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believes that many state courts have failed miserably in handling the
common law of custom when it comes to beach access, and we are aware
that some (by no means all) scholars are critical of state courts’ handling
280
of the matter as well. But, taking a page from Justice Scalia’s own
penchant for bluntness, who is he to criticize? As a self-appointed state
court judge in Beach Renourishment, he failed to impress. More
important, the Takings Clause does not cast federal judges in this role.
Why take it on?
Or rather, why not? There is a morbid fascination to witnessing the
professional frolics of a Justice apparently intent on demonstrating that
the original intent behind “good Behaviour” really does mean life tenure
281
no matter what —using the bench to denounce President Obama’s
282
“Dream Act”-style executive order on immigration enforcement, duckhunting with Vice President Cheney and then dismissing the questions
raised about his conduct as the product of “so-called investigative
journalists” prone to raise “silly” or “baseless allegations of impropriety”
283
that produce “inaccurate and uninformed opinion,” giving critics of
280. Bederman, supra note 247, represents perhaps the most thorough example of such a critique;
see David L. Callies, Custom and Public Trust: Background Principles of State Property Law,
30 Envtl. L. Rptr. 10003, 10019–20 (2000). These critiques rest on a profound distrust of evolution
and change in the common law—or as two commentators succinctly put it, “[c]ustom [m]ust [b]e
[r]eturned to the Blackstonian [f]ramework.” See David L. Callies & J. David Breemer, Selected Legal
and Policy Trends in Takings Law: Background Principles, Custom and Public Trust “Exceptions” and
the (Mis)use of Investment-Backed Expectations, 36 Val. U. L. Rev. 339, 369 (2001); id. at 372 (“The
[p]ublic [t]rust [doctrine] [s]hould [b]e [r]estricted to [i]ts [t]raditional [s]cope.”); id. at 379 (arguing
that “newly discovering or expanding such principles” is incompatible with property rights); see also
Callies, supra, at 10020 (treating Blackstone’s characterization of the law of custom not simply “as a
matter of reason, but as a matter of law since he is almost always cited in the reported American cases
on custom and customary law”). For a different view of the common law, see Blumm & Ritchie, supra
note 243, at 343–44.
281. U.S. Const. art. III, § 1 (“[Federal] judges . . . shall hold their Offices during good
Behaviour . . . .”). See United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 217–19 (1980). Frolics are not, of course,
listed in the catalog of impeachable offenses. U.S. Const. art. II, § 4 (“Treason, Bribery, or other high
Crimes and Misdemeanors”).
282. Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2521 (2012) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). See Adam Liptak, Court Splits Immigration Law Verdicts; Upholds Hotly Debated
Centerpiece, 8–0, N.Y. Times, June 26, 2012 at A1(L) (“Justice Antonin Scalia summarized his dissent
from the bench, a rare move that indicated his deep disagreement. Rarer still, he criticized a policy
that was not before the court: President Obama’s recent announcement that his administration would
not deport many illegal immigrants who came to the United States as children.”); David G. Savage,
Justice Scalia Went Too Far This Time, Some Say; The Conservative’s Dissent on Arizona’s
Immigration Law Is Called Strident and Partisan, Even for Him, L.A. Times, June 27, 2012, at A13. For
reactions, see E.J. Dionne, Jr., Too Political for a Justice, Wash. Post, June 28, 2012, at A21; Ed
Whelan, E.J. Dionne’s Anti-Scalia Tirade, Nat’l Rev. Online (June 27, 2012), http://www.
nationalreview.com/bench-memos/304185/ej-dionne-s-anti-scalia-tirade-ed-whelan.
283. Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for D.C., 541 U.S. 913, 927, 928 (2004) (Scalia, J., denying motion to
recuse). See Michael Janofsky, Scalia’s Trip with Cheney Raises Questions of Impartiality, N.Y. Times,
Feb. 6, 2004, at A14; Adam Liptak, In Re Scalia the Outspoken v. Scalia the Reserved, N.Y. Times, May
2, 2004 at A1; James B. Staab, The Political Thought of Justice Antonin Scalia: A Hamiltonian
on the Supreme Court 315–17 (2006).
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Bush v. Gore a contemptuous “[g]et over it,” powwowing with Tea
Party politicians in a (sadly or mercifully?—it’s hard to tell) closed
285
caucus, and hysterically denouncing an act of judicial modesty in
286
287
takings law as a modern Dred Scott. The list is endless. The spectacle
of an exalted federal judge showing state court judges that he can best
them at their own game apparently has a similar carnival attraction. In
some parallel universe where Sarah Palin wins the presidency to satisfy
the public’s morbid curiosity, there is much to be said for the prospect of
many more years of such self-assured performances, and it seems safe to
288
assume that we have not seen the last of them.
In the real world, however, the plurality opinion in Beach
Renourishment is more than a display of pique. It epitomizes a Court
never more than one vote away (if that) from an arrogance slipping out
of all restraint. Nor are we fully persuaded of what Sunstein so
generously assumed ten years ago—that the Court is in fact oblivious to
its conservative political agenda.

284. Joan Biskupic, American Original: The Life and Constitution of Supreme Court Justice
Antonin Scalia 9 (2009); Frank Cerabino, Student Fails to Persuade Justice Scalia, Palm Beach Post
(Fla.), Feb. 8, 2009, at B1; see Biskupic, supra, at 356 (dismissing a student’s question about televising
Supreme Court proceedings as a “nasty, impolite question”).
285. See George Bennett, Michelle Bachmann Delivers Tea Party Message in Palm Beach County,
Fort Lauderdale Sun-Sentinel, Mar. 4, 2011 (Tea Party Caucus leader’s remarks criticizing “judicial
activism”); Adam Liptak, Tea-ing up the Constitution, N.Y. Times, Mar. 43, 2010, at P1(L) (noting the
emphasis of the Tea Party movement on “the Constitution’s constraints on federal power”). Nor does
it seem consistent with Justice Scalia’s remarks to the Caucus. See Felicia Sonmez, Scalia’s ClosedDoor Session with Lawmakers Proves Light on Politics, Attendees Say, Wash. Post (Jan. 24, 2011)
http://voices.washingtonpost.com/44/2011/01/scalias-closed-door-session-wi.html (discussing Rep. Don
Manzullo’s quotation of Justice Scalia’s remarks: “Congress is ‘the 900-pound gorilla’ of the three
branches”).
286. Debra Cassens Weiss, Scalia Lumps Kelo Decision with Dred Scott and Roe v. Wade,
ABAJournal.com (Oct. 19, 2011), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/scalia_lumps_kelo_decision_
with_dred_scott_and_roe_v._wade (denouncing Kelo as the modern incarnation of Dred Scott (along with
Roe v. Wade)).
287. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 20, Toledo-Flores v. United States, 549 U.S. 69 (2006)
(No. 05-547) (asserting during oral argument that Mexican petitioner must be drinking tequila);
Transcript of Oral Argument at 9, Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (No. 02-102) (asking
whether “flagpole sitting” is “a fundamental right” in oral argument); Biskupic, supra note 284, at
312–13. Cf. Antonin Scalia, The Disease as Cure, 1979 Wash. U. L.Q. 147, 153 (commentary by thenProfessor Scalia unfavorably comparing Justice Powell’s concurrence in Regents of Univ. of Cal. v.
Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978), with Nazi racial doctrine). See generally Erwin Chemerinsky, The
Jurisprudence of Justice Scalia: A Critical Appraisal, 22 U. Haw. L. Rev. 385, 399–400 (2000).
Perhaps there is a public service in these performances, if we regard them as a real-world test of
the power of judicial “[e]xpressions of certitude” to generate a “neutrality crisis” in public perceptions
of the judiciary. See Dan M. Kahan, Foreword: Neutral Principles, Motivated Cognition, and Some
Problems for Constitutional Law, 125 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 57, 58, 61 (2011).
288. The haunted sense of self-doubt that Justice Scalia attributed to Chief Justice Roger Taney is
not likely to eclipse the Justice’s self-luster. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 1001
(1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting in part) (describing Roger Taney’s portrait at Harvard Law School).
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Yet the “ludicrous Republican rhetoric” is still with us, as the 2012
presidential campaign has reminded us. Predictable fulminations about
liberal judges out of control followed the Ninth Circuit’s decision that
289
California’s Proposition 8 was unconstitutional. It is worth putting
these fulminations in context, to see the real danger they pose:
distraction. Responding to right-wing attacks on the judiciary over
abortion, gay rights, and religion decisions with reminders of the
290
importance of an independent judiciary may too easily divert attention
from the real dangers. To put it another way, there is no reasonable
prospect that Congress is going to begin impeaching judges for
supposedly liberal decisions, and spending time worrying about the more
extreme proposals seems pointless. There is, however, more than a minor
prospect that the conservative agenda represented in the plurality
opinion will gain five votes in important cases, whether from Justice
Kennedy (a possibility strongly suggested by his vote to strike the entire
291
health care law ) or a new appointment.
Important as an independent judiciary is, focusing on the threat that
conservative judicial usurpation poses to democracy in the areas of
economic regulation, executive power, campaign finance, and
environmental protection—and responding to it forcefully and without
undue restraint or unearned respect—strike us as more pertinent to
today’s context. The threat of “an inflated notion of judicial
292
supremacy” comes not from attempts to rein in a President intent on
asserting arbitrary powers of detention but from the conservative
members of the Court. Perhaps liberals should take a page from the
293
and consider bills to limit the Court’s
Gingrich position paper
jurisdiction in those cases where its conservative instincts are most
overreaching. At the very least, one telling response to a rogue is to
expose it. Cases like Beach Renourishment deserve to be treated first and
foremost, not as objects of respectful analysis, but as symptoms of a
pathology.

289. See, e.g., Michael D. Shear, Republican Candidates Cram in Events with Voters Before Break
for the Holidays, N.Y. Times, Dec. 18, 2011, at A34 (discussing Newt Gingrich’s claims that “activist
liberal judges . . . [should] be brought before Congress to explain their rulings”); George F. Will, The
Absurdity of Eight-Sided Debate: How About a Debate of Substance?, Wash. Post, Nov. 6, 2011, at
A21 (noting that “Rick Santorum wants to ‘eliminate’ the often liberal 9th Circuit Court of Appeals”).
290. Cf. Bruce Ackerman, Off Balance, in BUSH V. GORE, supra note 278, at 209 (fearing that
“[n]othing good” can come from confrontation between the political branches and the Court).
291. Nat’l Fed. of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2642 (2012) (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas,
Alito, JJ., dissenting).
292. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 842 (2008) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
293. NEWT, supra note 7.

